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ABSTRACT
The Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion:
An Information Processing Analysis
(February, 1978)
R.L. Chaiken, B.S., University of Maryland
M.S., University of llassachusetts
,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Alice H. Eagly
Subjects read a persuasive message under either high or low perceived
consequences conditions: High consequences subjects read a message on
the same topic which they anticipated discussing and expressing their
views on at a future experimental session while low consequences subjects
read a message on a different topic. The persuasive message, which con-
cerned one of two topics (sleep habits vs. trimester system), was attri-
buted to a likeable or unlikeable communicator who presented either six
or two arguments supporting his overall position. Simple effects tests
on initial opinion change showed that high consequences subjects exhibited
significantly greater opinion change in response to messages containing
six (vs. two) persuasive arguments, but notin response to messr.ges from
likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicators; while low consequences subjects
exhibited, on a marginally significant basis, greater opinion change in
response to messages from likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicators, but
not in response to messages containing six (vs. two) arguments. The
pattern of results obtained on initial opinion change, as well as results
obtained on ether dependent measures were generally consistent with the
hypothesis that high consequences subjects would engage In a relatively
detailed ir.fcrmation processing strategy in which content-orieiited cog-
Ions would nediate opinioii change, whereas low consequences subjects
WL-nid •^ngaue in a comparatively low-level information proce.ssing strategy
vii
in which source-based cognitions would primarily mediate initial
opinion change. Qualified support was also obtained for the hypothesis
that content-mediated opinion change would persist longer over time than
would source-mediated opinion change: Opinion change decreased signifi-
cantly over a 10 day period for low consequences subjects but remained
virtually stable over time for high consequences subjects.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
An examination of recent research in the persuasion area reveals
at least two different conceptualizations of persuasion, one emphasizing
and one deemphasizing the importance of in-depth information processing.
The first conceptualization, which derives, at least in part, from tradi-
tional treatments of persuasion (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953;
McGuire, 1968, 1959), views persuasion as a rather detailed process in
which the individual's acceptance of the position advocated in the
persuasive communication is largely determined by the extent to which the
individual has attended to, comprehended, and yielded to or accepted
the arguments contained in the message. Such a conceptualization portrays
the message recipient as a rather rational, content-oriented individual
who bases acceptance (rejection) of the message's conclusion largely on
his (her) understanding and/or evaluation of the argumentation presented
(cf., Eagly, 1974; Kelman & Eagly, 1965). According to this general
viewpoint, any variable which affects opind.on change does so by influencing
any or all of the processes (attention, comprehension, yielding) that
mediate persuasion.
A second conceptualization cf persuasion reflected in recent empiri-
cal work, while not derived from any particular theoretical framework,
regards persuasion as a comparativ.ely low-level process in which accep-
tance of the position advocated in the message is based largely on the
individual's somewhat superficial examination of available information.
Thus, it has been suggested that individuals may often agree or disagree
with a message's conclusion on the basis of simple decision rules such as
whether or not the communicator seems credible (e.g., Miller, Maruyama,
Beaber, & Valone, 1976; McGuire, 1969) or on the basis of other non-content
information available, including information about the message recipient's
own internal states (e.g., Mintz & Mills, 1971; Giesen & Hendrick, 1974;
Munson & Kiesler, 1974) or information about the opinions of other m.essage
recipients (e.g., Landy, 1972). An implicit assumption of this second
conceptualization Is that a variable such as source credibility, for
example, may affect opinion change directly. Thus without necessarily
influencing the individual's attention to, comprehension of, acceptance of,
or reactions to the message's argumentation, source credibility ( or some
other variable) may directly affect the individual's tendency to accept
the message's overall position.
The distinction between persuasion as a relatively detailed process
and persuasion as a comparatively simple process is similar to distinc-
tions currently being made in the area of psychology of prediction and
explanation. As Ajzen (1977) has noted, the assumption that people employ
rather sophisticated information processing strategies to predict and/or
explain human behavior (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein. 1975; Trope & Burnstein,
1975; Kelley, 1967) is being challenged by the view that people often
rely on relatively simple intuitive heuristics (Tversky & Kahaeman, 1974)
or cognicive scripts (Ableson, 1976) is making their judgments. Analogously,
the view of persuasion as a detailed process portrays the massar^e recipient
3as a rather systematic information processor who carefully attends to and
screens incoming persuasive argumentation in arriving at his (her) opinion
judgments while the view of persuasion as a comparatively low-level pro-
cess portrays the message recipient as relying on relatively simple rules
or heuristics in arriving at her/his opinion judgments.
This thesis is concerned with reconciling these two views of the
persuasion process. It is assumed that each view is a valid description
of the persuasion process under certain conditions and an attempt is made
to explore what some of these condiJ:ions might be. More specifically, the
present concern is with investigating the conditions under which indivi-
duals tend to focus attentively on persuasive argumentation and tend to
base their opinions primarily on such content cues or the cognitive responses
to such cues (e.g., Greenwald, 1968) and, the conditions under which indi-
viduals tend to forego detailed scrutinization of the persuasive messages
they receive and, instead, tend to base their opinions primarily on non-
coutent cues or their cognitive responses to such cues. Though a variety
of non-content cues may often be available to and used by message recipients
in foraing taeir opinion judgments (e.g., information about the communica-
tor, information about the opinionsof others present in the situation,
information about the recipient's internal states), this thesis focusses
on the use of source cues, since source-related information is typically
available in most persuasion situations. Thus, the particular empirical
focus of the thesis might be stated as attempting to investigate the use
of source versus message cues in pfersuasicn.
A study by Taylor (1975), though aot in the persuasion area, provides
soTne insight into what conditions might favor the view of persuasion which
emphasizes relatively in-depth information processing, and what conditions
might favor the view of persuasion which emphasizes relatively low-level
information processing. In Taylor's experiment, designed to determine
some of the conditions under which people infer their attitudes directly
from their behavior (cf
. ,
Bem, 1972), female subjects received false physi-
ological feedback regarding their affective reactions toward photographs
of males. This feedback was either consistent or inconsistent with subjects
previously expressed attitudes toward the photos (attractiveness ratings)
and, further, subjects either expected or did not expect their attitude to
have important consequences (i.e., subjects did or did not expect to meet
the male who received their highest attractiveness rating). The results
indicated that when attitudes were reassessed, consistency of feedback
was only weakly related to the use of feedback in expressing one's attitude
More importantly, however, it was found that subjects used feedback regar-
ding their (supposed) physiological reactions to the photographic stimuli
in inferring their attitudes only when they expected no future consequences
to result from their attitude. When future consequences were anticipated,
subjects "engaged in a critical, time consuming reevaluation of their atti-
tudes in which feedback played a minimal role" (Taylor, 1975, p. 126).
Taylor concluded that Individuals may typically engage in relatively low-
level inferential processes, such as the one outlined by Bem (1972), when
asked to express an attitude on an issue of relatively little importance
but may engage in a more thoughtful information search vrhen asked cc expres
an attitude which has important personal consequences.
This thesis is undertaken very much i.n the spirit of Taylor's (1975)
conclusions. Regarding persuasion, it might be hypothesized that when an
5individual is faced with the decision of accepting or rejecting the posi-
tion advocated in a persuasive communication, and the issue is an important
one, then persuasion m.ay well be the outcome of a relatively sophisticated
cognitive process in which content-oriented cognitions mediate opinion
change. Given inconsequential or unimportant issues, however, persuasion
may be the outcome of a comparatively simple process in which individuals
engage in minimal processing of available information and tend to rely on
simple rules or heuristics in forming their opinion judgments. In order to
examine the plausibility of the hypothesis that issue importance or other
factors affect the nature of the cognitive processes involved in persuasion,
it is helpful to review some relevant literature from the persuasion area.
Review of relevant persuasion literature
One strategy for illuminating the conditions under which in-depth
processing of information contained in persuasive messages is important
in the persuasion process is to compare studies which have versus have not
demonstrated a relationship between mediational processes such as reception
and/or acceptance of argumentation and opinion change. Similarly, one
strategy for illuminating the conditions under which low-level processing
of non-content cues is predominantly important in the persuasion process
(at the expense of detailed processing of persuasive argumentation) is to
compare studies which have versus have no t demonstrated a relationship
between such cues and opinion change; and further, where non-content cues
have been shown to affect persuasion, to assess whether their persuasive
impact can or cannot be attributed to their influence on recipient's proces-
sing of the message's persuasive argtmientation.
6To pursue the above strategies thoroughly would be a formidable task,
requiring an examination of a substantial proportion of the existing
persuasive communication literature. Thus, in selecting studies for
review, some discretion was exercised. With respect to studies concerning
the relationship betwenn reception and/or acceptance of argumentation and
opinion change, primary consideration was given to experiments examining
the reception-persuasion link rather than the acceptance of argumentation-
persuasion relationship. This decision was based on two considerations.
First, there exists relatively more experimental (vs. correlational)
evidence bearing on the role of reception processes than on the role of
acceptance processes in persuasion. Second, in comparison to correlational
evidence regarding the reception-persuasion relationship, correlational
findings concerning the relationship between acceptance of supportive argu-
mentation and persuasion (e.g., correlations between measures of cour.ter-
arguing or measures of agreement with supportive arguments and opinion
change) are more difficult to interpret unambiguously in terms of the
causal direction of the relationship (cf., Norman, 1976; Miller & Baron,
1973) .
With respect to experiments concerning the relationship between non-
content cues and persuasion, because of the empirical focus of the thesis,
primary consideration was given to studies examining the impact of source
cues on persuasion. A primary factor used to select source studies for
review was that such eypsriments should provide (preferably on the inde-
pendent variable side but, at the very least, on the dependent variable
side) information relevant to assessing whether any observed impact of
source cues on persuasion could or could not be accounted for in terms of
7their impact on variables typically assumed to reflect individuals' pro-
cessing of persuasive communication content (e.g., comprehension, counter-
arguing, agreement with supportive arguments).
i
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In the next section, experiments dealing with the role of detailed
processing of argumentation in persuasion will be reviewed. Afterwards,
the review focusses on experiments concerning the impact of source cues on
persuasion. Finally, those conditions which appear to determine the rela-
tive importance of source and m.essage cues in persuasion will be summarized.
Experiments bearing on the importance of processing content cues in persuasion
,
Correlational studies. In general, studies providing correlational
evidence regarding the reception-persuasion relationship have not revealed
a consistently positive (or large) correlation between retention of message
content and opinion change (for discussions, see Eagly, 1974; Greenwald,
1968; McGuire, 1968). However, because inadequate measures of content
learning have often been employed (see McGuire, 1958; Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975) and, even when adequately constructed, such measures may only weakly
reflect the operation of reception processes in persuasion (Eagly, 1974;
Chaiken & Eagly, 1976), such experiments generally provide little basis
for discerning the conditions under which reception processes are important
in persuasion. However, a cursory examination of the correlational litera-
ture reveals a few dimensions which may be important in determining when
good reception of persuasive argumentation may facilitate opinion change.
Thus, for example, two experiments which did show a positive relationship
between message retention and persuasion (Wilson a Killer, 1968; Miller &
Campbell, 1959) employed mock courtroom procedures to introduce lengthy
argumentation regarding topics (law suits) abcut which subjects had no
prior information. In a study by McGuire (1957). which also obtained a
significant relationship between comprehension and opinion change, subjects
were told that the experiment was "an attempt to measure the comprhensibility
of information on controversial topics during unrehearsed interview
situations such as found in court rooms, press conferences, congressional
hearings, etc..." (McGuire, 1957, p. 103). In contrast, Zimbardo and
Ebbesen (1970), who found no relationship between comprehension and persua-
sion, told subjects that by reading passages (persuasive communications)
they would be helping the investigators in their study of "speech behavior".
Unlike subjects in the McGuire (1957) study, subjects learned of the
experimenters' interest in assessing their opinions and comprehension only
after being exposed to the persuasive massage.
Amount of argumentation and persuasion
. The results of experiments
which have varied the amount of argumentation presented in the persuasive
communication generally support the importance of reception of argumenta-
tion in persuasion, with greater persuasion associated with greater amounts
of supportive information provided (Eagly & Warren, 1976; 'Worman, 19 76;
Insko, Lind, & LaTcur, 1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; McCroskey,
1969; Cook, 1969 (experiment II but not experiment I)). In a series of
experiments reported by Insko and his associates (Insko, Lind, & LaTour,
1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974), subjects, role-playing jury members,
were presented with varying numbers of arguments supporting che guilt or
innocence of a fictitious person. In accord with earlier correlational
studies employing similar mock courtroom procedures (Wilson & Miller, 1968;
MJ.ller & Campbell, 1959), it was found consistently across the various
experiments reported that increasing the number of arguments provided
9significantly influenced subjects' judgments concerning the defendant's
guilt or innocence.
Subjects in Eagly and Warren's (1976) experiment received persuasive
messages containing either zero or 5 arguments attacking subjects' beliefs
on two cultural truism issues (cf., McGuire & Pap.^eorgis, 1961) - penicil-
lin use and toothbrushing practices. Subjects learned that the experiment
concerned "high school students and the way they handle problems", and
before listening to the communications, completed a verbal intelligence
measure which was introduced as "a test of some of your skills - it will
show you how you think and solve problems". The six minute long communica-
tions were introduced as "a slightly different problem". Subjects
exposed to five (vs. zero) persuasive arguments evidenced significantly
greater comprehension and opinion change. Further, high intelligence
subjects were more persuaded than low intelligence subjects given 5 argu-
ments, but less persuaded given no arguments, a result also consistent
with the proposition that reception processes are important in persuasion
(cf., McGuire, 1968).
Utilizing an impression formation cover story, Norman (1976) presented
subjects with a message containing six or aero arguments supporting the
claim that people should reduce the amount of time they spend sleeping.
The message was attributed to either a physically attractive (but inexpert)
or expert (b;\t physically unattractive) communicator. IThile, overall,
provision of arguments significantly affected agreement with the message's
conclusion, it was found that this was prim.arily the case for the expert
(vs. attractive) communicator.
Two experiments by Cook (1969) factorily crossed number of arguments
presented and scarce competence. Experiment I, which em.ployed a between
10
subjects design, was introduced as a study of "how people react to unex-
pected information". Subjects read a persuasive message containing either
one or 8 arguments supporting the proposition that teeth should be cleaned
only three times a week, labile the messages which subjects received were
either 204 words long (8 arguments condition) or between 21 and 30 words
long (1 argument condition)
, the length of the passages describing the
high and low competence source were 90 and 84 words long, respectively.
Though number of arguments presented significantly affected argument
recall, it had little impact on various measures of subjects' attitudes
toward toothbrushing (although it did affect agreement with the specific
recommendation that teeth be cleaned only three times per week) . In contrast
source competence exerted a strong impact on subjects' attitudes. In
Experiment II, high school subjects received the identical cover story.
However, four topics were employed (dangers of X-rays, toothbrushing, use
of penicillin, contagiousness of mental illness) and each subject served in
all experimental conditions. Further, the persuasive messages contained
either two or 10 arguments and, unlike the lengthy descriptions of the
communicators in Experiment I, source competence was manipulated via a
one-sentence description of the communicator. The results indicated that
while competence had been adequately manipulated, the attitude data
showed a main effect for number of arguments presented but not for source
competence. In sumiaary, the effect of number of arguments presented on
message agreement wa.s most evident in Experiment II which utilized a
wi thin-sub j acts design and where information about source competence was
lainimal and least evident in Experiment I v/hich utilized a betveen-subjects
design and in which a more potent manipulation of competence was employed.
Tr. should be noted that in both experiments , "source competence tended to
exert a stronger Impact on subjects' opinions within the high (vs. low)^
arguments conditions. Further, source competence exerted a significant
impact on counterargument production, with fewer counterarguments associated
with high competent sources.
McCroskey (1969), reporting the results of a series of experiments
regarding the persuasive impact of providing versus not providing evidence,
concluded that providing evidence generally facilitates opinion change when
source credibility is m.oderate or low, when the message is delivered with
few nonfluencies, and when the audience is unfamiliar with the evidence pre-
sented. Regarding the last point, Norman (Note 1), in two experiments with
Canadian subjects, found, relative to no-message control subjects, that
•experimental subjects agreed with the position advocated in the message only
when it contained information which was not redundant with previous informa-
tion knovm to subjects. Both experiments used presum.ably high-involvement
issues (Canadian-U.S. amalgamation, Canadian armaments production) and both
cover stories stressed the importance of attending carefully to the communi-
cation. In the second experiment, which employed only the amalgamation issue
and which added a source factor, subjects' agreement was unaffected, in com-
parison to a no-source condition, by whether the communicator was attractive
or expert.
Messac;e comprehensibility and persuasion . Two studies have investigated
reception processes in persuasion by varying the comprehensibility of persua-
sive argumentation (Eagly, 1974; McCroskey & Mehrley, 1969). In three expe-
riments by Eagly (197A), involving two different manipulations of arc^ument
comprehensibility (good vs. poor quality tape recordings: Experiments I and
II; well-ordered vs. randomly ordered sentences or half-sentences: Exy:criment
III), subjects in poor comprehensibility conditions shoved less corprehension
and less acceptance of the position advocated in the message than did subjects
in good comprehensibility conditions. In Experiment III, source credibility
did not affect agreement with the message's recommendation, either alone or
in interaction with comprehensibility. Subjects (in all three experiments)
were recruited to "obtain student reactions to lectures" and were told prior
to message exposure, that some subjects would get lectures that were difficult
to understand. Tae persuasive messages were either tape-recorded (Experiments
I and II) or written (Experiment III) and contained six lengthy arguments
supporting the recomaiendation that people should reduce the amount of time
they spend sleeping.
In the McCroskey and Mehrley (1969) experiment, subjects, participating
in a study on "speech styles", listened to a message advocating a guaranteed
annual wage for all industrial employees. The message, which contained
seven arguments, was either "well organized" (i.e., divided into three
distinct sections: introduction, body, conclusion) or highly "disorganized"
(i.e., within the three divisio ns .sentences were randomly ordered) and was
delivered with or without nonfluencies (e.g., vocal pauses, repetitions).
The well-organized, fluent message induced significantly greater persuasion
than did the other three message conditions. Unfortunately, no comprehension
measures were included so as to document the mediational role of argument
reception in accounting for the persuasion findings. In this study, source
credibility also influenced opinion change although it did not interact
with message organization or fluency.
Message complexity and persuasion . Regan and Cheng (1973) manipulated
message complexity in an experiment concerned with the role of distraction
in persuasion. Recruited for " a study on mass media", subjects vers told
to pav ca:.-«ful at:tention to the message. The tape-recorded message was
13
either easy- or dif f icult-to-understand and was received under distracting
or nondistracting conditions. The results indicated that distraction
enhanced persuasion for the simple message but decreased persuasion for
the difficult one. Further, distraction decreased subjects' perception of
the biasedness of the simple (but not complex) message and decreased (for
both simple and difficult messages) argument recall. Although these find-
ings are consistent with the hypothesis that distraction facilitates per-
suasion for simple messages (by counterargument disruption) and reduces
persuasion for complex messages (by interfering with message reception),
they are somewhat ambiguous regarding the specific role of reception proces-
ses in persuasion since the simple and complex message differed on at
least three dimensions (length, ease of landerstandir
g^ convincingness of
arguments). If not speaking directly to the reception-persuasion relation-
ship, the results are at least consistent with other research demonstrating
the importance of reception and/or acceptance processes in mediating the
effects of distraction on opinion change (e.g.. Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976;
Insko, Tumbull, & Yandell, 1975; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Haaland &
Venkatesan, 1968)
.
In an experiment more directly related to the reception-persuasion
relationship, Chaiken and Eagly (1976) presented subjects with a simple
or complex message (i.e., simple vs. compound sentence structure and
simple vs. sophisticated vocabulary) via the written, audio-, or video-
taped modality. In conditions where message complexity was expected to
decrease m.essage comprehensibility (audio- and video-tape but not written
conditions) , both comprehension and opinion change were significantly lower
for subjects receiving complex (vs. simple) messages. Subjects were
recruited "to help eval.jate the ability of law students to argue legal
lA
cases", and received a lengthy message concerning a fictitious legal
dispute. It should be noted that variations in the communicator's non-
verbal expressions of confidence, manipulated in audio- and video-tape
conditions, had no impact on opinion change.
In contrast to the Chaiken and Eagly (1976) study, Miller, Maruyama,
Beaber, and Valone (1976, Experiment III) found no differential impact on
opinions as a function of message complexity (manipulated via simple vs.
complex sentence construction)
.
Since no measures of comprehension were
obtained, it is possible that the Miller et al complexity manipulation
had no impact on opinions because it did not significantly affect message
comprehension (cf., Chaiken & Eagly, 1976). However, assuming that their
manipulation was strong enough to affect comprehension, the difference in
experimental contexts employed in the two studies may help to explain the
seemingly contradictory results. In the Chaiken and Eagly (1976) labora-
tory study, subjects read a 955-word message presenting new information on
an unfamiliar topic within a legal case context. In the Miller et al
(1976) experiment, the experimenter, posing as an interviewer for a local
radio program, approached subjects in a shopping center and requested that
they listen to a tape-recorded "listener's opinion on the topic for the
day". The 300-word message concerned the dangers of hydroponically grown
vegetables and was attributed to a produce ."anager at an area market.
Unlike the Chaiken and Eagly experiment, subjects were not told that their
opinions were desired until after message exposure. Like the previous
experiment, the topic was a novel one for subjects. However, according to
Miller et aly pretesting indicated that few persons knew what the word
hydropcnic meant or likely knew any arguments for or against hydroponic
growing methods. Thus, as the authors noted, the message argued "largely
15
on the basis of unfamiliar technical evidence for a conclusion which sub-
jects essentially had to accept on faith" (Miller et al, 1976, p. 622).
Suimarjr. Studies demonstrating a relationship between reception and/
or acceptance of argumentation and opinion change and thus supporting the
importance of detailed processing of content cues in persuasion tend to
share a number of common experimental features. One common feature is
the extent to which such experim.ents tend to employ experimental contexts
which focus subjects' attention on the persuasive communication content.
Some experiments have explicitly instructed subjects to pay careful atten-
tion to the persuasive message (Norman, Note 1; Regan & Cheng, 1973).
.
Others have employed experimental instructions which convey the experimen-
ter's interest in subjects' comprehension (McGuire, 1957) or problem-
solving skills (Eagly & Warren, 1976). Still other experiments have
employed mock courtroom or legal case contexts which no doubt convey to
subjects that they should attend carefully to the persuasive communication
content (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Insko, Lind, & LaTour, 1976; Calder, Insko,
& Yandell, 1974; Wilson & Miller, 1968; Miller & Campbell, 1959). Other
features which many of these experiments share is the extent to which they
'
have employed rather lengthy persuasive messages (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976;
Eagly & Warren, 1976; Eagly, 1974; Wilson ^ Miller, 1968; Miller & Campbell,
1959), employed completely novel topics (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Insko, Lind,
& LaTour, 1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; Wilson & Miller, 1968;
• Miller & Campbell, 1959), or constructed messages on (knorm) topics which
presented unfamiliar or new information to subjects (McCroskey, 1969;
Eagly & Warren, 1976; Eagly, 1974;- Cook, 1969; Norman, Note 1).
16
Experiments bearing on the impact of non-content cues on persuaRinn .
Impact of audience cues and recipient's internal states on persuasion.
Landy (1972) found that subjects expressed (marginally) greater agreement
with a counterattitudinal message when an overheard audience reacted
positively (vs. negatively) to the speech. This finding suggests that
individuals may often use consensus-type information in forming their
opinion judgments.
Giesen and Hendrick (1974) found that false physiological feedback
concerning subjects' arousal levels during exposure to persuasive messages
significantly affected opinion change such that high arousal feedback
enhanced persuasion. Mntz and Mills (1971), who manipulated actual
physiological arousal, found that arousal which was externally attributed
to the message resulted in greater opinion change than internally attri-
buted arousal. Further, arousal had no impact on comprehension. These
studies suggest that message recipients may sometimes use information
regarding their own internal states in making their opinion judgments.
Thus, as self-perception theory (Bern, 1972) might suggest, a subject who
attributes heightened arousal to the communication may infer that the
message had a strong impact on him (her) and thus be persuaded by it.
Regarding the conditions under v^hich these arousal effects have been obtained,
both experiments' cover stories stressed their ''concern" with drugs
(Mintz & Mills, 1971) or arousal (Giesen & Hendrick, 1974) and did not
mention explicitly or implicitly their interest in subjects' opinions. In
these experiments, then, it seems that the most salient information '.for
subjects was, in fact, information regarding their bodily states.
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Impact of sourcP, ru.. nn
^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ studies
indicate that source cues may often affect opinion change under "low invol-
vement" conditions. Johnson and Scileppi (1969) presented subjects with a
conununication recoir^ending that X-ray use should be curtailed. The 350-word
message was attributed to a communicator who was described in 120 words as
either a medical expert (high credibility) or a medical quack ( low credi-
bility)
.
Subjects in low involvement conditions learned that the study
was "mostly an experiment" and that the investigators were "not interested
In (subjects') opinions", while high involvement subjects were told that the
"important" study "concerned the ability of students to make sound and Intel
ligent judgments", and were told to read all materials carefully and be
thoughtful in answering the questionnaires. Subjects expressed (margi-
nally) greater agreement with the message's recommendation under low (vs.
high) involvement conditions and under high (vs. low) credibility conditions
More importantly, however, a significant interaction betv;een involvement
and credibility showed that source credibility exerted a differential
impact on opinion judgments only under low involvement conditions. Further,
credibility had no impact on message comprehension.
Rhine and Severance (1970) manipulated involvement by varying the per-
sonal relevance of the message topic. Subjects, who were told that the study
"concerned their opinions on a variety of issues" read a two page message
which recommended a tuition increase at the subjects' University (high
involvement) ot which concerned the amount of park acreage that should be
developed in Allentown, Pennsylvania ( low involvement) . These tvjo issues
were judged very ir.:portant and unimportant, respectively, by pretest sub-
jects. In lo^ involvement conditions, source credibility (marginally)
affected opinion while in high involvement conditions, credibility had no
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impact on opinions. However, high involvement subjects, while not res-
ponding differentially as a function of source credibility, did change
their opinions significantly (in comparison to a no-communication control
group)
.
The results of other experiments, though they did not manipulate
"involvement", are consistent with the above findings. Thus, as noted
earlier, Norman (Note 1), employing a presumably high involvement issue
for (Canadian) subjects (U.S .-Canadian amalgamation) and a cover story
which emphasized attending carefully to the message, found that agreement
with the message's conclusion was unaffected (in comparison to a no-source
control group) by whether the communicator was attractive or expert. And,
Johnson and Steiner (1968) found little attitude change, regardless of the
source's identity, when the (negative) communication concerned subjects'
personal traits.
Horai, Naccari, and Fatoullah (1974) orthogonally manipulated communi-
cator physical attractiveness and communicator-expertise and found that
both source characteristics (independently) affected opinions and that
neither expertise nor attractiveness affected message comprehension. In
this experiment, female junior high school students, recruited for an expe-
riment on "young people's reactions to opinions expressed in newspapers",
read a short message which advocated that high school students should
•receive a broaJ, general education. Since the opinions of a no- communication
control group ^rere slightly favorable toward the position advocated in the
message, it seems appa .nt that the persuasive message was not counter-
attitudinal for dnbiects. Finally, Snyder and Rothbart (1971) found that
physical attractiveness sigr.ificantly facilitated the communicator's
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persuasiveness and did not affect message comprehension. In this study,
a presumably low involvement topic was used (lowered speed limits). Fur-
ther, the audio- taped message was short, consisting of only one set of
arguments, and the investigators' interest in measuring subjects' opinions
was not made explicit until after subjects had listened to the persuasive
message which was introduced as a "talk on traffic safety".
The above research is generally consistent with the idea that source
cues most often influence opinion judgments under low involvement condi-
tions. Under high involvement conditions, subjects may be inclined to
evaluate the communication more critically and may tend to disregard
source cues. Consistent with this interpretation, Das, Roth, and Stagner
(1955) had subjects rank order 10 passages of poetry which were attributed
to authors who varied in prestige. While one group of subjects ("prestige"
group) was simply told to rank order the poems in term.s of merit, a
second ("understanding ") group was instructed to focus on the merit of
the poetry passages. The results showed that che source prestige factor
had a greater impact on subjects' rankings when the factor of "understanding"
was not brought into focus.
Other factors too may influence the tendency of message recipients
to use source cues in arriving at their opinion judgments. McCroskey (1970)
presented subjects with a persuasive message on the topic of federal control
of education which was attributed to a high or low credibility communicator
and which contained either strong or minimal evidence in support of the
message's overall conclusion. While credibility significantly affected
opinion change when minimal evidence was provided, it did not influence
opinions when strong evidence was presented. This finding suggests that
subjecus used information regarding the source's identity in forming their
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opinion judgments only when the nature of the information contained in the
message provided an insufficient basis on which to form an opinion judgment.
Another condition which may influence an individual's tendency to rely on
source cues in making their opinion judgments is suggested by the Miller,
Maruyama, Beaber, and Valone (1976) experiment reviewed previously. In that
experiment (study II), subjects listened to a tape-recorded message which
discussed, largely on the basis of unfamiliar technical evidence, the dan-
gers of hydroponically grown vegetables. The results indicated that the
speed at which the communication was delivered significantly affected per-
ceptions of the communicator's credibility (faster speech being associated
with greater perceived credibility) and significantly affected agreement
with the message's conclusion. Further, the results of this study (and
two others reported by the authors) indicated that the effect of speech
rate on persuasion was apparently not mediated by either reception processes
or by the tendency for subjects to differentially accept the arguments
presented in the message. One interpretation for these findings is that
subjects were forced to base their opinions of their perceptions of commu-
nicator credibility alone, simply because they were unable to evaluate the
merit of or even fully comprehend the message's argumentation due to its
highly technical nature.
Before turning to a closer examination of whether the persuasive impact
of source cues can or cannot be attributed to their influence on recipients'
processing of persuasive communication content, it is perhaps useful to
briefly revievr the findings of some of the early work by Hovland and his
associates (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hovland & Mandell, 1952; Kelman &
Hovland, 1953) regarding the impact of source cues on persuasion. Subjects
in the Hcvland and i^eiss ''1951) study received four persuasive messages on
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four different topics which were attributed to high or low trustworthy
connnunicators. The sources' identities were revealed to subjects at the
end of each persuasive message. Although the length of each message is
not reported, it is likely that they were of short or moderate length due
to the fact that subjects were exposed to four during the course of the
experimental session. The results indicated that on three of the four
topics, the high trustworthy source was significantly more persuasive
than the low trustworthy communicator. Further, trustworthiness had no
impact on a measure of content leraning. On a measure of opinion change
one month later (where the authors obtained the so-called "sleeper effect"),
no differential impact due to the sources' trustworthiness was obtained
on opinions. Kelman and Hovland (1953) exposed high school subjects to
a message on juvenile delinquency (length not described) which advocated
a (presumably) desirable point of view on the topic (lenient treatment of
delinquents). Via a fairly lengthy introduction, the communicator was
portrayed as either high in credibility (expert, trustworthy, attractive)
or low in credibility (inexpert, untrustworthy, unattractive)."'" In addi-
tion, differences in voice and style of delivery, in keeping with the
communicators' personalities suggested by the introduction, were maintained
during the tape-recorded presentation of the persuasive message. Using
this potent manipulation, the authors found significantly greater initial
agreement with the message's conclusion when the communicator was high
(vs. low) in credibility. On a three-v/eek delayed posttest, the differential
persuasiveness of the high (vs. low) credible communicator was apparent
only for subjects who, at the time of the posttest, were reminded of the
nicator's identicy. In accord with Hovland and Weiss' (1951) results.coiinnu "
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for subjects who were not reminded of the communicator's identity, the
effects of the credibility manipulation had declined entirely by the time
of the delayed opinion assessment. In contrast to these findings, Hovland
and Mandell (1952) found no significant difference in persuasion as a
function of communicator trustworthiness. In the experiment, subjects
were exposed to a relatively lengthy and detailed persuasive message which
argued that U.S. currency should be devalued. In contrast, information
provided regarding the communicator's trustworthiness/untrustworthiness
was conveyed via a short introduction which described the communicator as
either an economist at a leading University (high trust) or as the head of
an importing firm (low trust).
Cognitive mediation of source effects
. On the basis of those experi-
ments which have included measures designed to tap subjects' comprehension
of communication content, it seems likely that the impact of source cues
on persuasion is not typically mediated by reception processes. Assessing
whether source effects may be mediated by the tendency for subjects to
differentially accept the message's argumentation as a function of the
communicator's identity is more difficult since researchers typically do
not measure such processes directly but rather infer their operation from
obtained opinion change findings (cf., McGuire, 1968). However, the
results of the Miller, Maruyama, Beaber, and Valone (1976) experiment as
well as the results of experiments which have found no effect of source
cues on persuasion (Johnson & Scileppi's (1970) and Rhine & Severence's
(1970) high involvement conditions; Norman, Note 1; Johnson & Steiner,
1968; Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Eagly,- 1974, Experiment III; Das, Roth, ft
Stagner's (1955) "understanding" condition; McCroskey's (1970) strong
23
evidence condition; Hovland & Mandell, 1952) are consistent with the idea
that source effects are not typically mediated by differential acceptance
of the supportive arguments contained in the persuasive communication.
Also consistent with this notion is the observation that source credibi-
lity effects tend to dissipate over time (Cook & Flay, Note 3; Gillig &
Greenwald, 197A; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951) whereas
the effects of presenting good evidence in support of a message's conclusion
tends to result in relatively sustained opinion change (McCroskey, 1969).
If credibility effects were typically mediated by differential acceptance
of communication content, then it might be expected that credibility effects
would remain more stable over time.
At least a few studies, however, suggest that source effects on opinion
change may, under some conditions at least, be accounted for in terms of
their facilitative effects on acceptance of supportive argmnents. For
example, Cook (1969, Experiment I) found that source credibility signifi-
cantly affected opinion change and, further, that subjects produced signi-
ficantly fewer counteragruments and rated the message's arguments as
significantly more powerful when the message was attributed to a high (vs.
low) credibility communicator. And, Norman (1976) found, for an expert
(but not attractive) communicator, that subjects' agreement with the specific
arguments presented in the message was significantly correlated with their
agreement with the m.essage's overall conclusion. For the attractive com-
municator, the finding that argument agreement did not correlate with over-
all agreement, is consistent with other research and theorizing (Mills &
Harvey, 1972; Kelnan, 1961) suggesting that the impact of source attractive-
ness on perstiasion is relativ.^.ly independent of reaction to the specific
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arguments presented in the message. Finally, Johnson, Torcivia, and
Poprick (1968) found that a high credible communicator exerted signifi-
cantly greater opinion change that a low credible communicator on both
an immediate and delayed posttest. The fact that in this experiment,
the effects of credibility did not dissipate over tim.e, is consistent
with the idea that credibility may have exerted its impact on opinions by
differentially affecting subjects' acceptance of the message's arguments.
This conclusion assumes that accepting a message's arguments provides more
cognitive supports for the individual's newly adopted opinion, and thus
makes it more stable over time than does simple acceptanceof the message's
overall conclusion.
A more direct demonstration that source credibility can facilitate
acceptance of supportive arguments was provided by Ajzen and Sejwacz (Note
2). In their experiment, subjects were presented with various statements
(e.g., "There is a 60% chance that violence shown on TV increases the
nation's crime rate.") attributed to sources who varied in perceived cre-
dibility. Instead of rating their agreement with the statements, subjects
indicated their probability of accepting the various statements. The
results indicated that probability of acceptance increased with source
credibility.
It is of some interest to note that all three persuasion experiments
which suggest that source credibility may sometimes affect opinion change
indirectly by facilitating acceptance of persuasive arguments (Cook, 1969,
experiment I; Norman, 1976; Johnson, Torcivia, & Poprick, 1968) employed
persuasive messages which attacked subjects' beliefs in cultural truisms
(e.g., sleep habits, toothbrushing, X-rays). While these messages were,
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no doubt, highly counterattitudinal (unlike the topics used innany experi-
ments which have obtained source effects), it is likely that subjects had
never been exposed to information countering their beliefs or even possessed
any cognitive supports for their beliefs (cf., McGuire, 1964). Thus, when
exposed to communications which presented novel arguments attacking
their beliefs, it is conceivable that subjects found it a difficult task
to evaluate the merit of the message's arguments. Being uncertain as to
the validity of such arguments, it seems plausible that subjects might
use communicator-related information as an additional aid in evaluating
the validity of the message's arguments. In situations in which the mes-
sage's argumentation is relatively easy to evaluate on its own merit, it
seems likely that recipients' judgments regarding argument validity will
not typically be influenced by their perceptions of the communicator (e.g.,
McCroskey's (1970) strong evidence condition). It mght be hypothesized
that to the extent that the arguments presented in a message are intelli-
gible to the individual and can readily be evaluated with some degree of
certainty by the individual, source credibility may have little influence
on the person's tendency to accept such arguments. However, to the extent
that the message's argumentation cannot be evaluated with much certainty,
the individual may well use additional information about the communicator's
identity in assessing the merit of the argumentation provided.
Summary
. Experiments which have successfully demonstrated the impact
of non-content cues, particularly source cues, on persuasion share a number
of commonalities. One common feature is the extent to which such studies
tend to employ experimental contexts which reduce the likelihood chat sub-
jects' attention will be focussed on the persuasive message content. For
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example, the Giesen and Hendrick (1974) and Mintz and Mills (1971) expe-
riments utilized cover stories which rather explicitly focussed subjects'
attention on the non-content cues (subjects' arousal level) whose persua-
sive impact was to be demonstrated, but which neither explicitly nor impli-
citly conveyed to subjects (prior to message exposure) that their opinions
were of interest to the investigators. This "sin of omission" is common
to many experiments demonstrating the persuasive impact of source cues as
well. An extreme example is provided by Johnson and Scileppi (1969) who
found that source credibility significantly affected opinion change when
(low involvement) subjects were told that the study was "mostly an expe-
riment" and that the investigators were "not interested in (subjects')
opinions". In contrast, source cues have been shown to have little impact
on opinion judgments when subjects have been explicitly instructed to
attend carefully to the persuasive communication content (e.g., Norman,
Note 1; Das, Roth, & Stagner's (1955) "understanding" condition; Johnson
& Scileppi's (1969) high involvement condition). Another commonality is
the degree to which source effects on opinion change have been obtained
when proattitudinal issues or issues of relatively low importance or per-
sonal relevance have been used (e.g., Rhine & Severnce's (1970) low
involvement condition; Horai, Naccari, & Fatoullah, 1974; Snyder & Roth-
bart, 1971) but not when issues of high importance or personal relevance
have been employed (e.g., Rliine & Severnce's (1970) high involvement condi-
tion; Norman, Note 1; Johnson & Steiner, 1968). Other research suggests
that message recipients may rely on source cues in forming their opinion
judgments when the message's argumentation provides an insufficient basis
on which to form an ooiniou judgment (McCroskey, 1969) or when the argu-
27
mentation is so technical that it is difficult or impossible for the
recipient to process (Miller, Maruyama, Beaber, & Valone, 1976).
Those experiments which have included measures of content learning
show no evidence that source effects on opinion change are mediated by
reception processes. Further, the majority of experiments reviewed pro-
vide little support for the view that source cues typically affect per-
suasion via their impact on recipients' tendencies to differentially
accept the argumentation contained in the message. Those experiments which
are consistent with the view that source effects are mediated by argument
acceptance processes (CookA969 ; Johnson, Torcivia & Pop rick, 1968 ; Norman, 1976)
suggest that this is most likely to be the case when the message contains
novel or unfamiliar argumentation that is difficult to evaluate on its
own merit.
Summary of relevant persuasion research: conditions affecting the impact
of source versus message cues on persuasion .
Individuals may base their opinion judgments primarily on their under-
standing and/or evaluation of the persuasive argumentation provided rather
than on their reactions to source (or other non-content) cues when they
believe that it is important to be well informed on the persuasive commu-
nication issue. One factor which likely affects the individual's motivation
to be well informed on the communication topic is the extent to which the
individual perceives that holding a particular opinion on the issue has
important future consequences for him(her)self or for other persons. A
number of experiments which have successfully demonstrated the impact of
content cues on persuasion have presented persuasive messages to subjects
in the context of legal disputes (Chaiken & Eagly, 19 76; Insko, Lind L
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LaTour, 1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; Wilson & Miller, 1968;
Miller & Campbell. 1959). In these experiments, subjects' opinions were
essentially verdicts and. though perhaps having few personal consequences
for subjects, certainly had consequences for the persons or groups invol-
ved in the legal disputes. When the individual perceives that his (her)
opinion judgment will have personal consequences Ce.g.. the individual
may anticipate having to defend his (her) opinion or may anticipate having
to engage in behavior congruent with his (her) opinion), it also seems
likely that the individual will be motivated to be well informed on the
communication issue and will thus tend to base his (her) opinion judgment
primarily on his (her) understanding and/or evaluation of the argumen-
tation provided. When few or no consequences are anticipated, individuals
may be less motivated to be well informed on the communication issue and
therefore less inclined to process information presented in the message.
Instead, individuals may form their opinion jtadgments using relatively
simple rules or heuristics based on their reactions to available non-
content cues. Studies which have simply asked subjects to offer their
opinions on comparatively inconsequential issues (e.g.. Horai, Naccari.
& Fatoullah, 1974; Snyder & Rothbart, 1971; ItLller, Maruyama, Beaber, &
Valone, 1976) have found that subjects' opinions were strongly affected
by information regarding the communicator, but no evidence that either
reception cr argument acceptance processes have mediated these observed
source effects. It should be noted that in the pre3c'..t context, the
term future consequences applies to situations characterized by Kelman
(1958, 1961) as involving the internalizatioa (vs. identification or
compliance) process of opinion change. Thus, the zerm does not refer to
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situations in which the message recipient perceives that holding a cer-
tain opinion has consequences or implications with respect to establishing
or maintaining some self-defining relationship to the communicator or to
situations in which the recipient believes that the public expression of
a certain opinion has consequences with respect to facilitating some
strategically-based interpersonal goal.
Another factor which may affect the individual's motivation to be
well informed on the communication topic and therefore his/her willing-
ness to process persuasive communication content is the inherent impor-
2tance or personal relevance of the comm.unication topic. Inhere topics of
little importance or personal relevance have been employed (e.g., Rhine
& Severence's (1970) parks issue; Snyder & Rothbart's (1971) speed limit
issue; Miller et al 's(1976) hydroponics issue), the findings suggest that
subjects have tended to form their opinion judgments primarily on the
basis of source cues, with little evidence that these effects have been
mediated by either reception or acceptance processes. In contrast, where
topics of high importance or personal relevance have been used, the findings
suggest that source cues have typically not affected opinions but that
subjects have changed their opinions on the basis of information contained
in the persuasive communication (e.g., Norman's (Note 1) Canadian-U.S.
amalgamation issue: Rhine & Severence's (1970) tuition issue; Eagly's (1974)
sleep issue) . Further, in those few studies where source effects have
been obtained with issues of greater importance or personal relevance,,
the persuasive impact of source cues can plausibly be accounted for in
terms of their impact on subjects'' tendencies to accept the arguments con-
tained in the n^essage (e.g.. Cook's (1969) toothbrushlng issue; Norman's
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(1976) sleep issue)
.
Even when individuals are willing to process incoming persuasive
argumentation, the quality or quantity of this information may work to
force the individual to rely primarily on source or other non-content
cues in arriving at an opinion judgment. Thus, as noted earlier, sub-
jects in the Miller et al (1976) experiment may have based their opinions
ontheirperceptions of the communicator's credibility alone, simply be-
cause the highly technical argumentation provided in the message was too
difficult for subjects to evaluate with any certainty. And, McCroskey's
(1970) experiment which showed that source cues affected opinion change
only when minimal evidence was provided, suggests that when insufficient
argumentation is provided, recipients may have little information other
than the communicator's identity on which to base an opinion judgment.
Recipients' attention to source versus message cues and therefore
their tendency to use source versus message cues in forming their opinion
judgments may also be influenced by the sheer quantity of information per-
taining to each source of information. Studies which have demonstrated
the impact of m.essage reception on opinion change but have found no impact
of source cues on persuasion, have exposed subjects to rather lengthy
messages but rather brief descriptions of the coiranunicator (e.g., Eagly,
1974, Experiment III; Cook, 1969, Experiment II). In contrast, studies
where source effects have been obtained, have tended to supply subjects
with greater amounts of information about the communicator relative to
the amount of information ccntained in the message (e.g.. Cook, 1969, Expe-
riment I) or, when source descriptions have been brief (or manipulated via
non-written materials) subjects have been exposed to relatively short
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messages (e.g., Snyder & Rothbart. 1971; Horal. Naccari, & Fatoullah.
1974).
Finally, the studies reviewed previously suggest that subjects'
attention to and therefore use of source versus message cues may vary
depending upon instructional set. VJhen instructions make message content
salient for subjects, message cues may heavily influence subjects' opinions
while source cues may have minimal impact (e.g., Johnson & Scileppi's
(1969) high involvement condition; Eagly (1974), Experiment III; Chaiken
& Eagly, 1976; Norman, Note 1; Das, Roth, & Stagner's (1955) understanding
condition)
.
CHAPTER II
TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF TITO INFORMATION PROCESSING
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF PERSUASION
Much research in persuasion implicitly assumes that yielding to the
position advocated in a persuasive communication is often influenced by
the information presented in or elicited by the persuasive message, whose
contents consist primarily of a series of arguments which presumably pro-
vide cognitive supports for the message's overall position. In this broad
view of the persuasion process, the persuasive impact of independent vari-
ables (e.g, source variables) is largely ascribed to their impact on recep-
tion processes and/or argument acceptance processes. This conceptualization
of persuasion emphasizes the importance of detailed information processing
and the role of content-oriented cognitions in mediating opinion change.
In contrast, a second conceptualization of persuasion deemphasizes the
importance of detailed information processing and the mediational role of
content-oriented cognitions. As some researchers (e.g., Mller, Maruyama,
Beaber, & Valone, 1976; Eagly & Himmelfarb, 1974; McGuire, 1969) have sug-
gested, individuals may often engage in only a minimal aracunt of information
processing and may base their opinion judgments on a rather superficial
assessment of available information. In this second view of persuasion, the
persuasive Impact of source (or other independent) variables may be ascribed
to their direct impact on the recipient's tendency to yield to the overall
position advocated in the message.
Both views of persuasion portray the message recipient as concerned with
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assessing the validity of message's overall position. However, according
to the first, and more "systematic" view, the message recipient expends a
great deal of cognitive effort in performing this task: he(she) actively
attempts to understand the message's arguments and to assess the validity
of the arguments in relation to the message's overall conclusion. While
the recipient's attention is primarily focussed on the message's argumen-
tation, other available information, particularly communicator cues, may
also be used to evaluate the argumentation, especially when such argumenta-
tion is difficult to assess on its own merit. However, because communicator
cues, when utilized at all by the recipient, should function as a secondary
source of information in judging message validity, it would be expected that
variations insource characteristics might bear only a weak and inconsistent
relationship to opinion change in situations where the "systematic" view
accurately describes the persuasion process.
According to the second, and more "heuristic" view of persuasion, the
message recipient expends relatively little cognitive effort in deciding
whether to accept (or reject) the message's overall position. Instead, the
recipient may use (the more or less) readily available information in the
form of source (or other non-content) cues in judging message validity.
Should the persuasion process proceed along these lines, then it would be
expected that while variations in source characteristics may exert a strong
impact on opinion change, variations in message characteristics (e.g.,
amount of supportive argumentation provided, comprehensibility of supportive
argumentation, validity of supportive argumentation) may bear only a weak
relationship to opinion change.
Basing acceptance of the message's overall position solely cn information
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from source (or other non-content) cues may reflect the operation of rela-
tively general rules (scripts, schemas) developed by the individual through
his(her) past experiences and observations (cf., Abelson, 1976; Stotland &
Canon, 1972). Thus, it is likely that individuals have developed the schema,
or the categorical script (Abelson, 1976) that statements made by recognized
experts can, with reasonable confidence, be accepted as veridical descriptions
of reality; or, the schema that statements made by persons perceived as
generally trustworthy can, with reasonable confidence, be considered to
reflect those persons' honest opinions rather than ulterior motives. With
regard to source attractiveness, on the basis of past experience, the indivi-
dual may have abstracted a rule suggesting that "people generally agree
with people they like". Alternatively, the liking/agreement schema may
represent a higher-order schema, perhaps derived from a lower-order rule
suggesting a fairly consistent association between the concepts of liking
and interpersonal similarity (Stotland & Canon, 1972). In any case, the
individual may accept (reject) the position advocated by an attractive
(unattractive) source because of the simple rule that he/she typically
agrees (disagrees) with people he/she likes (dislikes). It should be noted
that this interpretation of source attractiveness effects in persuasion
differs considerably from motivational explanations which suggest that indi-
viduals accept influence from attractive sources out of a desire to emulate
or identify with them (Xelman, 1958, 1961), or to maintain cognitive con-
sistency (Keider, 1958); and also differs from a simple conditioning e-rpla-
nation which suggests that a favorable (or unfavorable) attitude toward
the position advocated results from the contiguity of presentation of an
affectively positive (or negative) communicator and the overall position
advocated.
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This thesis has attempted to provide some insight into what factors
might favor the "systematic" view of persuasion, with its focus on detailed
information processing, and what factors might favor the "heuristic" view of
persuasion, with its focus on relatively minimal information processing. '
Based on the earlier review of the literature, it seems reasonable to hypo-
thesize that the systematic conceptualization of persuasion will be most des-
criptive of the pers-oasion process when the persuasive communication issue is
important or peisonally relevant or when message recipients perceive that
holding an opinion on the issue has important consequences for themselves or
for others. On the other hand, the "heuristic" view of persuasion will be
most descriptive of the persuasion process when the persuasive communication
issue is relatively unimportant or personally irrelevant, or when message reci-
pients perceive that holding an opinion on the issue has few consequences. A
corollary hypothesis suggests that variations in source characteristics are
likely to exert a greater impact and variations in message characteristics a
lesser impact on persuasion when issues of low importance or personal relevance
are involved, or when a minimum of future consequences are anticipated. In
contrast, given important or personally relevant issues, or situations where
individuals do expect that their expressed opinions will have consequences
for themselves or others, variations in source characteristics are likely to
exert a lesser impact and variations in message characteristics a greater
impact on persuasion. Before presenting an experiment which was designed to
explore some of the ideas which have been discussed, two inplications of the
above hypotheses, one regarding the stability of opinion change and one
regarding individual differences, should be considered.
Stability of opinion chan<;e . One implication of the preceding discus-
sion concerns the stability or persistence of opinion change. First, it
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important to note that although individuals' opinions may often be consi-
dered strategic responses made in the interests of situational utility
rather than genuine attitude change (cf., Gialdini, Levy. Herman. Ko.lowski,
& Petty, 1976). this thesis has assumed that acceptance of the overall
position advocated in the message, whether it be an outgrowth of the reci-
pient's detailed scrutinization of the argumentation presented or a product
of the individual's decision to accept the overall position simply on the
basis of source (or other non-content) cues, represents genuine opinion
change. Nevertheless, the stability or persistence of opinion change may
differ when opinion judgments have been made primarily on the basis of
content versus source cues. Essentially, when a person changes a belief
on the basis of who the source is
, rather than what the source says, it
is probable that the person possesses fewer topic-relevant cognitive sup-
ports for the new belief than does the person who has changed a belief
primarily on the basis of what the source has said, since what the source
has to say typically consists of topic-related arguments or statements
which serve to support the overall belief advocated in the message. If
this reasoning is correct, and it can be assumed that belief or attitude
change with respect to some attitudinal topic tends to remain stable over
time to Che extent that it is adequately supported by other topic-relsvant
cognitions, then it might be hypothesized that opinion judgments formed
primarily r>n the basis of content cues will tend to persist longer over
time than will opinion judgments formed primarily on the basis of source
(or other r.on-content) cues. The observation that credibility effects tend
to dissip^:te over time CCook & Flay, Note 3; Gillig & Greenwald, 1974)
whereas tl.e effects of presenting evidence tends to persist (McCroskey
,
19f?9)
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is generally congenial to this hypothesis.
In passing.however. it should be noted that it may not always be the
case that opinions adopted solely on the basis of source (or other non-
content) cues will fail to exhibit stability over time. Thus, despite the
fact that an individual who has initially adopted an opinion primarily on
the basis of non-content cues may well lack supporting topic-relevant cog-
nitions, that individual's subsequent expressions of an opinion (on the
same attitudinal topic) may still exhibit stability under certain conditions
.
Such conditions might include situations in which opinion reassessment occurs
in a context where those cues on which the initial opinion judgment was
based are present and (still) salient for the individual, or situational
contexts in which the original acceptance (rejection) cues, although absent,
have, for whatever reason, remained salient. Of some relevance here are
Kelman and Hovland's (1953) findings regarding reinstatement of the communi-
cator in the delayed measurement of opinions: Whereas the initial persu-
asive advantage of a high (vs. low) prestige source tended to dissipate
entirely when, at a three-week delayed posttest, subjects were not reminded
of the communicator's identity, the effect of reinstating the communicator
cue at the time of the posttest was to reestablish, to a large extent, the
initially observed differences in agreement induced by the prestige manipu-
lation.
Individual differences
. Just as situations may differ with respect to
the degree to which they foster low-level versus detailed information
processing strategies on the part of message recipients, so too may indi-
viduals differ in their habitual tendencies to engage in minimal versus
detailed processing of information available in tbe persuasion situation.
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To this author's knowledge, there are no existing individual difference
measures which attempt to tap directly the extent to which individuals tend
to engage in minimal versus detailed information processing. However,
individual difference measures such as locus of control orientation (Rotter,
1966), need for cognition (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955; Cohen, 1957),
as well as others (e.g., intellignece, cognitive complexity) may. to some
extent, reflect this individual difference dimension.
CHAPTER III
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE USE OF
SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES IN PERSUASION
Introduction and Predictions
The present experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that when
future consequences are perceived to stem from an individual's expressed
opinion on some issue, that variations in message characteristics should
exert a strong impact on opinion judgments whereas variations in source
characteristics should exert a minimal impact; but when little or no
future consequences are anticipated, variations in source characteristics
should exert a strong impact on opinion judgments whereas variations in
message characteristics should exert a lesser impact. As a secondary goal,
the experiment examined the relative stability over time of opinion change.
In the study, communicator likeability, number of persuasive arguments
provided, and the perception of future consequences were experimentally
manipulated. Communicator likeability was varied by having the coipjuunicator
either prise or insult college students prior to delivering a persuasive
message (on one of two topics) to college student subjects. The number of
persuasive arguments provided was manipulated by preparing persuasive mes-
sages which contained either two or six arguments supporting the message's
overall position. The expectation of future consequences was varied by
-presenting subjects with a persuasive message which concerned the same topic
or a different topic from the topic subjects anticipated discussing with
other students and being interviewed about at a (hypothetical) future
experimental session. The. future consequences manipulation was designed
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AO
to create two persuasion contexts differing in terms of the degree to
which they would foster detailed versus low-level information processing
strategies on the part of subjects: Subjects in high perceived consequences
conditions should be highly motivated to be well informed on the topic of
the persuasive message and should therefore expend the cognitive effort
required to understand and carefully screen incoming persuasive argumenta-
tion so as to arrive at some correct, valid, or defensible position on the
issue. In contrast, it was assumed that subjects in low consequences con-
ditions, because they should have little stake in being well informed on
the issue discussed in the communication, would opt for a relatively simple
information processing strategy in which the readily available information
about the communicator's identity would be used as a major criterion in
accepting (rejecting) the message's overall position.
The major dependent variable was opinion change — measured (in the
laboratory) immediately after exposure to the persuasive communication and
then reassessed (over the phone) in a different context approximately 10
days later. Other dependent measures included the time spent by subjects
reading the persuasive message, subjects' comprehension of the message's
supportive arguments, subjects' thoughts elicited by exposure to the per-
suasive m.essage, and subjects' perceptions of the communicator. These
latter measures were included in order to explore the cognitive mediation
of opinion change.
Given high conseq*uences , variations in the amount of supportive argu-
mentatj.on provided should exert a strong impact on initial opinion judgments
whereas variations in comniunicator likeability should exert a minimal
impact. Given low perceived consequences, however, variations in the
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amotint of supportive information provided should exert a minimal impact
on initial opinion judgments whereas variations in communicator likeabi-
lity should exert a stronger impact. Thus, within high consequences
conditions, it was predicted that the simple arguments effect but not
the simple likeability effect would be significant on initial opinion change,
while, within low consequences conditions, it was predicted that the simple
likeability but not the simple arguments effect would be significant. These
simple effect predictions generated the overall prediction that the full
analysis of variance would yield both a significant Consequences X Likea-
bility and Consequences X Arguments interaction on initial opinion change.
While very strong confirmation of the hypothesis would include finding no
overall effect due to either the likeability or arguments manipulation, it
was anticipated that main effects due to both these variables would also be
obtained on initial opinion change.
The consequences main effect should not be significant on initial opi-
nion change since opinion judgments based on content-related information
should not necessarily differ in initial magnitude from opinion judgments
formed primarily on the basis of source cues. However, a consequences main
effect on delayed opinion change, indicating greater change for subjects in
high, compared to low, consequences conditions, would be expected if, as
hypothesized earlier, source-mediated opinion change tends to be less stable
over time than content-mediated opinion change. If the (presumably source-
mediated) opinion change expressed by subjects in low consequences conditions
decreases significantly between opinion posttests while the (presumably
content-mediated) opinion change shown by subjects in high consequences
conditions does not, then the Time of Assessment X Consequences interaction
lid be significant in a repeated measures analysis of variance on opinion>nou.
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change
.
Subjects' responses on other dependent measures should provide addi-
tional support for the above hypotheses. In high perceived consequences
conditions, in comparison to low perceived consequences conditions, subjects
should exhibit greater comprehension of the message's arguments, should
spend a greater amount of time reading the persuasive communication, and
should generate a greater number of message-oriented than communicator-
oriented thoughts in response to the persuasive message. In addition, sub-
jects' comprehension scores, and message-oriented thoughts should tend to be
significantly correlated with initial opinion change in high, but not low,
perceived consequences conditions. In low, but not high, perceived conse-
quences conditions, subjects' perceptions of the communicator should tend
to be significantly correlated with initial opinion change.
Method
Overview
Subjects read a persuasive message from a likeable or unlikeable com-
municator who presented six or two arguments in support of the overall
position he advocated. The topic discussed in the message (sleep habits or
trimester system) was either Identical to or different from the topic that
subjects anticipated expressing their views on at a (hypothetical) future
experim.ental session. After reading the message, subjects indicated their
opinions and gave other responses- Approximately 10 days later, subjects'
opinions were reassessed in a non-laboratory context.
Subjects
A total of 207 University of Itassachusetts ' psychology students (88
males and 119 females) served as experimental subjects. Data from 24 of
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these subjects were discarded: Six subjects were elitninated because they
could not be contacted for the delayed measure of opinions and 7 were eli-
minated because they were over 25 years of age. Eleven more subjects were
dropped because they suspected an influence attempt (3). questioned the
experiment's cover story (6), or associated the delayed opinion posttest
with their earlier laboratory participation (2) . Fifty additional students
served as opinion-only control subjects. All subjects received extra credit
toward their course grades for participating.
Procedure
Subjects were recruited for a two-session experiment dealing with
"people's attitudes and the discussions that revolve around individuals'
varying perspectives on issues", and participated in the first (and, in
actuality, only) session in numbers ranging from one to six persons (average
session size = 2. A subjects). One of three experimenters (two males, one
female) greeted subjects and then summaraized what would transpire in the
"first" experimental session. According to the experimenter, subjects would
receive further details regarding the "second and major" experimental session,
be assigned discussion topics, give their preliminary opinions on various
discussion topics, and give their reactions to "one other set of materials".
After this introduction, the experimenter described the (hypothetical)
second experimental session. Subjects were told that they each would be
interviewed by an experimenter who, after requesting some background infor-
aiation, would ask for their opinions on their assigned topics as well as
their reasons for holding their opinions. Subjects learned that the inter-
views, which would provide ''an in-depth reading of their opinions", would
be tape- j;ecorded and transcribed into written format for content-analysis.
Assurance was given that subjects' names would not appear on the written
transcripts. Next, the experimenter explained that "in the major portion
of the second session", subjects would participate in small discussion
groups with other undergraduates who had been assigned to their same topics.
The experimenter said that each group would discuss "their respective views
on their assigned topic" and that the purpose of holding the discussions was
"to study the processes by which groups do and do not arrive at judgments
on issues". It was also stated that the discussions would be tape-recorded
and later content analyzed.
At this point, the experimenter mentioned that a similar study had
been conducted the previous semester and that the study had used the same
discussion topics but had not employed undergraduate subjects. Instead,
the experimenter said that the previous experiment had used faculty members
and various University administrators as subjects in order to study "people
who frequently had to formulate decisions in groups". It was said that the
previous study had yielded "interesting results" and that the present study
was being conducted with undergraduates so that "comparisons could be made
between the two subject populations".
After soliciting questions regarding the procedures for the "second"
session, which subjects learned "would be held later in the semester", the
experimenter announced that it was time to assign subjects to discussion
topics. Subjects were told that groups were being formed around "the same
topics used in the previous study", and received a page listing five topics.
Three topics concerned campus -related issues and two concerned health-related
issues. Topics three and four on this list were "whether or not people
should sleep less that the typical average of eight hours per night", and
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"whether or not the University should switch from its two-semester system
to a trimester system", respectively. The experimenter explained that
because "it was a poor research strategy to allow people to choose topics
and/or discussion groups", each subject would be randomly assigned a dis-
cussion topic. The experimenter then "randomly" assigned each subject a
topic by drawing (with replacement) numbered slips of paper from a container.
In actuality, all paper slips were numbered 3 or 4. Thus, all subjects
were assigned either the sleep (3) or the trimester topic (4).
Immediately after the sham drawing, subjects received a form which
requested "scheduling information". On this form, subjects indicated their
age, sex, name, phone number, local address, and also wrote down their assi-
gned topics. To enhance 'expectations that a second session would be taking
place, subjects were also asked to indicate their "best days/ times" to be
scheduled for the "second session".
Next, the experimenter said that because "many of last semester's
subjects had been unclear about what would actually transpire in the second
session", it had been decided that "this semester" subjects would read a
transcript of a discussion or an interview from the previous study in order
to "get a better idea of the second session". The experimenter added that
"because the interviews were shorter than the discussions", subjects would
read interview transcripts. After explaining that "20 interview transcripts'
had been selected for presentation to subjects, the experimenter gave each
subject one of 16 different versions of a transcript (persuasive message,
see below) . These 16 versions represented all combinations of the likeabi-
lity, arguments, topic, and message rendition conditions of the experiment
(see below). Subjects were told to read the transcripts and to signal their
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completion by placing the transcripts face down. After distributing the
transcripts, the experimenter went into an adjoining room and started a
stop-clock. By observing subjects through a one-way mirror, the experimenter
recorded the time that each subject spent reading his/her transcript.
After all subjects had finished reading, the experimenter returned
and collected the transcripts, remarking. "Well, I hope that gives you a
better idea of the interview situation". The experimenter next said that
it was important to assess subjects' preliminary opinions on the various
discussion topics. Each subject then received a one-page questionnaire
(see Appendix I) on which they indicated their opinions on the various dis-
cussion topics. Depending upon whether a subject had been given a trans-
cript containing a sleep message or a trimester message, opinion statement
3 or 4 corresponded exactly to the position which had been advocated in
the subject's transcript.
Next, the experimenter explained that since "a secondary focus of the
research concerned how people react to the opinions of others", subjects
would complete a questionnaire which asked for their reactions to the
interviews they had just read. This questionnaire (see Appendix i) contained
the remaining dependent measures (described below). After completing the
questionnaire, subjects were thanked for participating and were told that
they would be recontacted for the "second session".
Approximately 10 days after the first (and only) session (mean delay =
10,39 days; range = 8 to 15 days), subjects were telephoned by an experi-
menter who was blind to their experimental condition. Upon reaching a
subject, thi experim.ent :;r stated:
47
Hello, (subject's name). I am (name). I am calling
for Project CONTACT, a student survey project being
conducted by a survey research group in the psych-
ology department. This semester, we've been polling
students about how they feel about various aspects of
UMass life. Tonight we are focussing on students'
feelings about various aspects of the University
structure and, in addition, on students' feelings and
opinions about physical and psychological well-being.
You have been randomly selected as part of to-
night's sample. Your name will not be used in any
way and your responses are confidential. Would you
mind answering a few questions for us?
After the subject had agreed or declined (N=0) to participate, the expe-
rimenter introduced the first 5 survey questions as dealing with University
structure. The fifth of these assessed subjects' agreement with the tri-
mester proposition. Next, five more questions, dealing with "physical
and psychological well-being", were introduced and the fifth of these
items assessed subjects' agreement with the sleep proposition. The phone
instrument appears in its entirety in Appendix I . After administering
the complete instrument, the experimenter probed for suspicion by asking
the subject if he/she had participated in any "similar surveys" during
the semester. Finally, the subject was thanked for cooperating.
After completing the entire experiment (laboratory session plus phone
contact), each subject received a letter which described the experiment's
true purposes and hypotheses, and discussed the deceptions which had been
employed. The letter also invited subjects to m.eet with the senior expe-
rimenter if they desired to discuss the experiment further.
Interview Transcripts
The transcipts began with an interviewer asking an interviewee (here-
inafter referred to as communicator) for background information. Tlie
(male) communicator was portraj^ed as a University administrator who worked
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with undergraduates in various student organizations. After the communi-
cator either praised or insulted undergraduates in response to a question
from the interviewer, the interviewer mentioned the communicator's (sup-
posedly) assigned topic (sleep or trimester) and asked him to state his
overall position on the topic. The communicator stated either that he
thought people should sleep fewer than 8 hours per night or that the Uni-
versity should switch to a trimester system. Next, the communicator pro-
vided various arguments supporting his overall position. Finally, the
interviewer thanked the communicator "for participating in the interview".
The complete set of interview transcripts employed in the experiment
appear in Appendix II.
Independent Variables
Perceived future consequences. The perception of future consequences
was manipulated by whether or not subjects received a persuasive message
(interview transcript) on the same topic that they, themselves, anticipated
being interviewed about and discussing at the (hypothetical) second expe-
rimental session. Approximately half of those subjects assigned the sleep
topic received a sleep message (high consequences) while half received a
trimester message (low consequences) and approximately half the subjects
assigned the trimester topic received a trimester message (high consequences)
while half received a sleep message (low consequences)
.
Comraunicatcr likeability . ITie communicator (interviewee) either praised
or insulted undergraduates upon being asked by the interviewer, "Hov; do-
you like working with undergraduates?" (cf., Jones & Brehm, 1967; Eagly
& Chaiken, 1975). In the likeable condition, zhe ccuimunicatcr ans-wered:
Well, as a matter of fact. I really enlcy it let.
VJhen I first started m.y job here at the University
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I was a little apprehensive about the idea of
working so much with undergraduates. Over the
years, however, I've realized that my apprehension
was unjustified. The undergraduates who I've metboth in my work with various student organizations
and in other settings as well strike me as being
pretty responsible and mature. They're really
concerned, I think, with their role in society.
I don't know of course, but sometimes I think
that the public too often underestimates the
ability and maturity of today's college student.
They just don't give undergraduates enough credit.
Anyway, it's no wonder that I continue to do the
work that I do... For me, working with undergraduates
has been pretty rewarding.
In the unlikeable condition, the communicator answered:
Well, as a matter of fact, I don't really enjoy it
very much, \n\en I first started my job here at the
University I was a little apprehensive about the idea
of working so much with undergraduates. Over the
years, I'm sorry to say, I think my apprehension has beenjustified. The undergraduates who I've met both
in my work with various student organizations and in
other settings as well strike me as being pretty ir-
responsible and immature too. They're really uncon-
cerned, I think, with their role in society. I don't
know of course but sometimes I think that the public
too often overestimates the ability and maturity of
today's college student. They give undergraduates
more credit than they deserve. Anyway, sometimes I
wonder why I continue to do the work I do... For me,
working with undergraduates really hasn't been very
rewarding.
Topic
.
To provide an internal replication, two topics — sleep habits
and the trimester (vs. semester) system — were employed. The position
advocated in the sleep messages was "People should sleep much less than
the typical average of 8 hours per night", and the position advocated in
the trimester messages was "The University should switch from its current
two-semester system to a trimester system". Thesa statements were selected
after pretesting with 50 pilot subjects who indicated their agreement (15-
point agree/disagree scale) with a total of 23 opinion statements on a
variety of topics. The major criterion for selection of the two opinion
statements was that they have similar mean opinion ratings falling in the
"disagree moderately" range (10 to 12) of the agreement scale. Additional
criteria Included choosing statements whose opinion ratings had relatively
low variability and statements for which supportive arguments could be
constructed.
Number of arguments and message rendition
. Tlie amount of persuasive
argumentation presented to subjects was varied by preparing messages
which contained either six or two arguments supporting the messages'
overall position. Six arguments were constructed for each topic. The
basic arguments for the sleep topic were: (1) successful people sleep
less than 8 hours, (2) via short naps, REM sleep can be maximized, (3)
long sleep periods are associated with heart disease and other ailments,
(4) people who have shifted from 8 or more to less than 8 hours of sleep
feel better, (5) sleep time varies from culture to culture and is thus
arbitrary, and (6) people who sleep 6 rather than 8 hours perform better
in experiments measuring problem solving skills. For the trimester topic,
the basic arguments were: (1) the trimester system reduces the campus
population at any one point during the year, thereby creating an intimate
atmosphere, (2) the trimester allows greater academic individuality
which enables sttidents to graduate earlier, (3) the trimester provides
the freedom to -^^acation during seasons other that the traditional summer
months, (4) the trimester is economical since University buildings are
used year round, (5) the trim ter reduces competition for part-time jobs
since student vacations occur at different times, and (6) the trimester
operates successfully at the University of Michigan where both faculty
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and students report liking it.
For each message topic, two renditions of the six arguments' version
and two renditions of the two arguments' version were prepared. For the
|
six arguments' messages, the two renditions contained the same six argu-
ments but presented them in two different (randomly selected) orders.
For the two arguments' messages, the two renditions each contained two
different arguments, drawn randomly from the pool of six.
Measuring Instruments
Opinions
.
At the laboratory session, subjects gave their opinions on
the two experimental topics by indicating their agreement with the statements,
"People should sleep much less that the typical average of 8 hours per
night", and "The University should switch from its current two-semester
system to a trimester system". Each of these ratings was made on a 15-
point scale whose anchors were labelled "agree strongly" and "disagree
strongly". Over the phone (approximatey) 10 days later, subjects indicated
their agreement with the statements, "People should sleep less than the
usual 8 hours per night", and "The University should change over to a
trimester system". These statements were read to subjects by the experi-
menter and subjects responded orally with respect to a 5-point scale whose
endpoints were "definitely agree" and "definitely disagree".
Cognitive responses to the persuasive message . To provide a gross
measure of the cognitive effort expended by subjects in processing the
content of the persuasive message, the time that each subject spent reading
his/her interview transcript was recorded.
On the first page of the second extJerimental questionnaire (see Appen-
dix I), subjects were asked to "List below your thoughts and ideas about
Low
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what the person who was interviewed said during his/her interview". Belc
this statement were a series of lines with the word "Idea" appearing at
the left margin of each line. Subjects were allotted 3 minutes for this
task. Unlike scoring procedures employed in similar thought-listing tasks
(e.g., Greenwald, 1968; Osterhouse & Brock. 1970), subjects 'statements were
coded by two independent raters according to the following scheme: Each
statement was categorized as either a "Communicator-oriented" or a "Message-
oriented" thought, and, in addition, as either a positively, negatively,
or neutrally valenced thought. Statements which could not be clearly as-
signed to one of the six resulting categories were placed in a residual
"other" category.
A statement was scored as a communicator-oriented thought if it clearly
referred to the communicator rather than the topic and/or content of the
persuasive message and, further, was not judged to be an inference about
the communicator's traits/states based on the subjects' impression/evalu-
ation of the message. Communicator-oriented thoughts were scored positive
(C+) or negative (C-) if they reflected positively or negatively on the
communicator (e.g., "He was very polite", "He seems very relaxed" vs.
"He was a little close-minded", "He seems like a bitter person"). Communi-
cator thoughts which were judged neither positive nor negative (e.g.,
"Sounds like a liberal parent", "Hesitant about talking about self") or
which restated information presented via the likeability manipulation (e.g.,
"He likes working with undergraduates", "He thinks undergraduates are imma-
ture") were scored as neutral (Co).
A statement was considered a message-oriented thought if it clearly
referred to so-ie aspect of the content and/or topic of the message, or if
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it was judged to be an inference about the communicator derived from
subjects' perceptions of the message (e.g., "He knew a lot about his
topic"). Message-oriented thoughts were scored positive (W-) or negative
(M-) if they reflected general approval or disapproval of the message
(e.g., "Person took a good stand" vs. "I disagreed with what he had to
say") or specific agreement or disagreement with particular arguments
(e.g.. The economic advantages of the trimester agree with me" vs. "I
question REM training"). Counterarguments (e.g., "Biological needs differ
from person to person") and statements challenging the logic or validity
of the message (e.g., "Reasons for trimester not sound logically")
were thus included in the M- thought category. Neutral message-oriented
thoughts (Mo) included restatements of the message contents (e.g., "He
desires trimester") and statements which were judged neither postive nor
negative (e.g., "He based much of what he said from things he had read
about", "REM can be controlled which I didn't know").
Statements which could not be clearly placed into any of the above
six categories were coded as "other thoughts " (0). "Other thoughts"
included statements referring to the interview context (e.g., Background
data seems irrelevant", "It was simple and basic in terras of questions")
and statements judged ambiguous in terms of whether they referred to the
coTranunicator or to the message (e.g., "Person was involved in social affairs
yet attitudes didn't seem to go together").
With one exception (Other thoughts) , inter-rater reliability was quite
high. Correlations (Pearson's r) between the two raters' judgments for
each of the seven categories and for the total number of thoughts coded
for each subject were: C+: .35, C-: .82, Co: .75, M+: .86, M-: .88, Mo: .86,
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0: .53, total thoughts: .97.
Source percep^ _on. Subjects rated the communicator on 15-point bipolar
adjective scales. Positive poles of the 12 adjectives used were warm,
knowledgeable, modest, intelligent, approachable, competent, likeable,
trustworthy, pleasing, sincere, friendly, and unbiased.
Message comprehension. Subjects were asked to write down each argu-
ment that the communicator had used to support his overall position. An
argument was scored correct if, in the judgment of two independent raters
(rH86), it accurately summarized one of the arguments contained in the
persuasive message. Subjects were also asked to write down the topic and
overall position taken by the communicator. All subjects correctly recalled
the topic of the message and all but four (retained in the analyses) correct]
specified the overall position taken in the message.
Other measures
.
On 15-point scales, subjects indicated how important
the message topic was, the extent to which they desired tc be well informed
on the topic, how much effort they had put into reading the message, and
how interested they had been in attempting to understand the communicator's
reasons for his opinion. Subjects also indicated whether they had spent
more time thinking about the coironunicator and his characteristics or more
time thinking about the communicator's reasons for his overall opinion
(15-point scale). After completing these measures, subjects wrote down
their interpretations of the study. Tliese responses were coded for suspi-
cion of persuasive intent and suspicion of the experiment' ' s ccver story.
At the completion of the delayed opinion posttesr, subjects were asked if
they had been in any "similar opinion surveys". Subjects who at this point
or at any other time during the phone contact indicated prior familiarity
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with the opinion statements or explicitly mentioned their earlier labora-
tory participation, were coded as aware of the association between the
laboratory session and the delayed opinion posttest.
Results
In addition to the primary experimental variables of interest (per-
ceived consequences, communicator likeability, number of persuasive argu-
ments, and, on opinions, time of assessment), message topic (sleep vs.
trimester), subject sex, and message rendition (nested within levels of
topic and number of arguments) were included in preliminary data analyses.
The message rendition variable, included in the design for external vali-
dity concerns, accounted for few and, due to its nature, relatively
uninterpretable effects on the various dependent measures. For this
reason, all reported analyses were performed collapsing over this variable.
Although the topic and sex variables also accounted for few effects, they
were retained as factors in the reported analyses, primarily because of
the reduction in error variability which accorapanied their inclusion.
Despite random assignment to treatments and the deletion of data
from subjects over 25 years old, analysis of variance on age yielded a
4
number of significant effects. Because the various experimental groups
could not be considered equivalent in terms of age, all further analyses
employed age as a covariate.
In summary, all reported analyses employed age as a covariate and
included subject sex and message topic as independent variables in addition
to the primaiy experimental variables. Because of their minimal theoretical
relevance, effects involving the sex and topic variables, while noted for
ail dependent measures, are typically not described in detail.
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Check on Experimental Conditions
The information given to subjects regarding the communicator's
attitude toward undergraduates was successful in Influencing their per-
ceptions of his likeability: The communicator who praised undergraduates
was judged significantly more likeable <M=4. 25) than the communicator
who insulted undergraduates (M=8.80), F(l. 150)=93. 69 .£< . 001. Varying
the number of persuasive arguments presented to subjects also had its
intended impact: Subjects recalled significantly more persuasive arguments
when they read a message containing six, rather than two, arguments
(M=2.82 vs. M= 1.56), F(l,150)=72. 15, £<.001.
The perceived consequences variable was manipulated by presenting
subjects with a persuasive message on a topic which was identical to
(high consequences) or different from (low consequences) the topic they
had been assigned to discuss and be interviewed about at a future experi-
mental session. All subjects correctly specified their assigned topic
and subjects in high, com.pared to low, consequences conditions spent more
time reading the persuasive message (M=196.87 seconds vs. M=181.72 seconds),
I^(l,150)=11.84, J2.<.001; reported spending more time thinking about the
connnunicator's reasons for his opinion rather than this personal characte-
ristics (M=8.84 vs. M=7.38), F(l,150)=5.57, £<.05; and expressed a (non-
significantly) greater desire to be well informed on the topic discussed
in the message (M-6,24 vs. M=7.05), F(l,150)=1.88,4i= .17.
It is important to note that being assigned a topic did not, in itself,
lead subjects to "strategically" moderate or shift their opinions in any
apparent way (cf., Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976): Two-
way Topic Received X Topic Assigned analyses of variance performed on
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subjects' initial and delayed opinions on both the sleep and trimester
topics revealed that the Topic Received main effect was significant on
all four agreement measures (£'s< .05 or smaller) while the Topic Assig-
ned main effect was nonsignificant (all F's< 1.0) . The significant Topic
Received main effect on subjects' agreement scores indicates that the
persuasive messages were successful in inducing shifts in opinions while
the lack of a Topic Assigned main effect indicates that simply expecting
to discuss and be interviewed about a particular topic had no influence
on immediate or delayed agreement with either the sleep or trimester
propositions. Further, experimental subjects assigned the sleep topic
who received a trimester message and experimental subjects assigned the
trimester topic who received a sleep message showed no lesser or greater
(immediate or delayed) agreement with the sleep or trimester propositions,
respectively, than did pilot subjects (N=50) who simply indicated their
opinions on a variety of topics (£'s> .25 or larger, Dunnetts test). In
contrast, regardless of topic assigned, experimental subjects exposed to
a sleep message and those exposed to a trimester message indicated signi-
ficantly greater (immediate and delayed) agreement with the sleep and
trimester propositions, respectively, than did opinion-only pilot subjects
(£'s^.025 or smaller, Dunnetts test).
Opinions
Subjects indicated their opinions on the sleep and trimester topics
inunediately after message exposure and, again, approximately 10 days later.
^
Opinion change scores were formed by subtracting from each subjects'
(initial and delayed) opinion on his/her message topic, the mean opinion
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expressed by an internal control group: All subjects who received a sleep
message formed an internal control group for subjects who read a trimester
message, while all those subjects who received a trimester message formed
an internal control group for subjects who read a sleep message. It should
be noted that the opinions expressed by internal control subjects did not
differ significantly from those expressed by the external control group of
opinion-only pilot subjects (sleep topic: M=10.23 vs. M=10.72 for internal
and external controls, respectively, t(137)=.80, n.s.; trimester topic:
M=10.32 vs. M=10.54 for internal and external controls, respectively,
t,(142) =
.34, n.s.).
A five-way Sex X Topic X Consequences X Likeability X Arguments ana-
lysis of variance (age as covariate) was performed on subjects' initial
opinion change scores and also on their delayed opinion change scores. To
explore opinion change over time, a third analysis was performed on opinion
change using time of assessment (immediate vs. delayed) as a repeated mea-
sures factor in addition to the above between subjects variables. The
results of these three analyses are reported separately. Mean opinion change
for the major experimental conditions are shown in Table 1.^
Insert Table 1 about here
Initial opinion change
.
Analysis of subjects' initial opinion change
scores yielded main effects due to communicator likeability, _F(1,150)=4.05,
£<.05, and number of argumencs presented, F^(l,150)=4.15,£< .05: On an
overall basis, subjects exposed to a likeable coinnuni cator showed signifi-
cantly greater initial oninion change (11-2. AS) than did subjects exposed
59
to an unlikeable coimnunicator (M=1.58); and. subjects exposed to six
argun^ents exhibited significantly greater initial opinion change (M=2.72)
than did subjects exposed to only two arguments (M=1.A2).
Confirmation of the major experimental hypothesis required obtaining
a pattern of results on initial opinion change such that, within high con-
sequences conditions, the simple arguments but not the simple likeability
effect would be significant while, within low consequences conditions, the
simple likeability effect but not the simple arguments effect would be sig-
nificant. These specific simple effect predictions generated the overall
prediction that the full analysis of variance would yield both a Consequences
X Likeability and a Consequences X Arguments interaction. Although neither
of these interactions reached conventional levels of significance in the
analysis of initial opinion change (Consequences X Likeability F(l,150)=1.34.
£=.25; Consequences X Arguments F (1, 150)=1. 42
. .24), the results of
simple effects tests were generally in accord with specific predictions.
Thus, within high consequences conditions, subjects exposed to six arguments
showed significantly greater initial opinion change (M =3.16) than did
subjects exposed to only cwo arguments (M=1.32), simple F(l,150)=6. 68,
2.^ .05; while, within low consequences conditions, subjects exposed to
six arguments showed only nonsignif icantiy greater change than did subjects
exposed to only two arguments (K= 2.33 vs. M= 1.52), simple i; (1,150) =
1.05, 71,3. On the other hand, v/ithin low consequences conditions subjects
exposed to likaable communicators showed, on a r^irginally significant
basis, greater initial opinion change (M=2.54) than did subjects exposed
CO unlikeable corjnunicators (N=1.24), simple £ (1, 150)=2 . 97 , 2r '09;
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while, within high consequences conditions, subjects exposed to likeable
connnunicators showed only nonsignificantly greater change (M=2.40) than
did subjects exposed to unlikeable communicators (M=1.97), simple FU. 150)
< 1.0. In Figure 1, panel A displays initial opinion change as a function
of communicator likeablility and perceived consequences and panel B
displays initial opinion change as a function of number of arguments
presented and perceived consequences.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Delayed opinion change
. The analysis of subjects' delayed opinion
change scores yielded a significant arguments, effect, F(l,150)=5.48,£<.025;
As they had on initial opinion change, subjects who read messages containing
six arguments showed significantly greater opinion change 10 days after
message exposure (M=2.36) than did subjects who had read messages containing
only two arguments (M=1.16). The consequences main effect was also signi-
ficant in this analysis, F;(1,150)=4.19, £< .05: Subjects in high conse-
quences conditions exhibited significantly greater opinion change on the
delayed posttest (M=2.20) than did subjects in low consequences conditions
(M=1.35). The communicator likeability main effect was only marginally
significant in the analysis of delayed opinion change, F^(l,150) = 2.53,
_p=.ll: Subjects originally exposed to a likeable comjnunicator manifested
only slightly greater opinion change on the delayed posttest (M=2.15) than
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did subjects originally exposed to an unlikeable communicator (M=1.30).
Opinion change over time
. To explore opinion change over time,
subjects' opinion change scores were submitted to a 6-way analysis of
covariance (age as covariate) which included 5 between subjects factors
(consequences, likeability, arguments, sex, topic) and one repeated mea-
sures factor (time of assessment). Before presenting the results of
primary interest - those involving the time of assessment variable -
those results involving between-subj ects factors only are briefly summa-
rized.
The repeated measures analysis yielded a significant arguments
effect, F(l,150)=5.52, 2<.025, a marginally significant likeability effect,
F(l,150)=3.74, £=.06, and a marginally significant consequences effect,
F(l, 150)= 2.71, £=.10. Thus, ignoring time of assessment, subjects exhibited
significantly greater opinion change in response to messages containing six,
rather than two, arguments (M=2.5A vs. M=1.29); and manifested marginally
greater opinion change when exposed to a likeable, rather than unlikeable,
communicator (M=2.31 vs. M=1.44) or when in high, rather than low, conse-
quences conditions (M'2.20 vs. M=1.64).
Turning to those results involving the repeated measures factor, a
significant time of assessment main effect, 2(1»151)=3.96, £<.05, indicated
that opinion change decreased significantly between the initial and delayed
posttest (M=2.07 vs. M=1.76>. However, the marginally significant Time of
Assessment X Consequences interaction, F(l,151)=2.15, p<.15, suggested
chat this overall tendency was limited to subjects in low consequences
conditions: In accord with predictions, opinion change decreased signifi-
cantly over tii-ie fcr low consequences subjects (M=1.93 vs. M^l.35), simple
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F(l,15.1)=5.23. £<.05. but remained virtually stable for high consequences
subjects (M=2.21 vs. M=2.20), si.ple_F(1.151X 1.0. I^e significant decay
in opinion change for subjects in low but not high consequences conditions
accounts for the fact that the consequences main effect was significant
on delayed opinion change (£<.05) but not on initial opinion change (^>.30)
Figure 2 displays initial and delayed opinion change for high and low
consequences subjects, respectively.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The above findings are qualified somewhat by the significant Time of
Assessment X Consequences X Likeability interaction, F(l,151)=4.00, £<.05
(see Table 2 for marginal means). The Time of Assessment X Consequences
interaction was significant within likeable communicator conditions,
£<.025, but nonsignificant within unlikeable conditions, F<1.0: When
Che communicator was likeable, high consequences subjects showed no
decrease in opinion change between posttests, F<1.0, while low consequences
subjects did show a significant decrease, £^.01. When the communicator
X7as unlikeable, however, neither high nor low consequences subjects exhi-
bited a significant decline in opinion change between posttests (simple
F's<1.0). Ag the means in Table 2 suggest, however, the nonsignificant
decrease for low consequences subjects exposed to an unlikeable communi-
cator may be due to a baseraenc effect.
Insert Table 2 about here
Effects, involvin?^ topic and sex. The topic main effect attained
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marginal significance. ^=.09. in the repeated measures analysis of opinion
change and also in the separate analyses of initial and delayed opinion
change (both £'s=.12): Trimester messages tended to engender greater
opinion change than did sleep messages. In addition, the Consequences X
Likeability X Arguments X Topic interaction was significant in the repeated
measures analysis, £<.05. This interaction also attained significance in
the analysis of delayed opinion change, £= .05, and was marginally signi-
ficant in the analysis of initial opinion change, £-.06. Table 3 presents
the marginal means for this interaction. In essence, the 4-way interaction
indicates that the opinion change findings obtained when the topic variable
was ignored were somewhat more pronounced within trimester message conditions
than within sleep message conditions. In fact, although the patterning of
opinion change means was generally consistent within both topics, simple
effects tests revealed that within sleep conditions, the primary experi-
mental variables had no significant impact on opinion change. The fact
that the consequences, likeability, and arguments manipulations exerted
little differential impact on the opinions of subjects reading sleep,
rather than trimester, messages may be due to the low overall amount of
opinion change induced by the sleep messages in comparison to the trimester
messages.
Insert Table 3 about here
As noted earlier, the patterning of initial opinion change means
obtained across topics (see Figure J.) proved genearlly supportive of the
prediction that the arguments manipulation would exert a stronger Impact
on the initial opinion judgments of subjects in high (vs. low) conseq;;ences
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conditions while the likeability manipulation would exert a stronger impact
on the initial opinion judgments of subjects in low (vs. high) consequences
conditions. Figure 3. which displays initial opinion change as a function
of likeability and consequences (panel A) and as a function of arguments
and consequences (panel B) for subjects in sleep and trimester conditions
separately, indicates that while the patterning of means obtained within
trimester conditions corresponds closely to the patterning obtained across
topics, the patterning obtained within sleep conditions is only moderately
consistent. Both across and within topics, the likeability manipulation
tended to more strongly affect the initial opinion judgments of low, rather
than high, consequences subjects. However, as Figure 3 illustrates, and
the results of simple effects tests suggest, che across topics finding that
the arguments manipulation more strongly affected the initial opinion judg-
ments of high (vs. low) consequences subjects, is primarily due to the res-
ults obtained within trimester conditions: Within trimester conditions,
the simple Consequences X Arguments interaction was marginally significant,
£<.10; and, further, the simple arguments effect was significant for high,
£<.05, but not low consequences subjects, F<1.0. In contrast, within
sleep conditions, the simple Consequences X Arguments interaction was non-
significant, F<1.0; and, further, the simple arguments effect was nonsigni-
ficant for both high and low consequences subjects (F's< 1.0).
Insert Figure 3 about here
In addition to the marginally significant topic main effect and the
significant Consequences X Likeability X Arguments X Topic interaction
described above, the repeated measures analysis of opinion change also
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yielded a significant Ti.e of Assessment X Sex X Topic interaction, a
significant Time of Assessment X Consequences X Arguments X Topic interaction,
and a significant Time of Assessment X Likeability X Arguments X Topic
interaction (^•s<
.05). Due to their lack of interpretability and their
questionable theoretical relevance, these higher-order interactions are
not discussed further. The interested reader is referred to Appendix m
where the marginal means described by these interactions appear.
Amount and Type of Time Spent Reading the Persuasive Message
An analysis of the amount of time each subject spent reading the
persuasive message indicated that subjects in high, in comparison to low.
consequences conditions spent more time reading the persuasive message
(M=196.87 vs. M_=181.72 seconds). F(l,150)=ll. 84. £<.001. Also, as would
be expected
.
subjects spent more time reading the message when it contained
six. rather than two, arguments (M=216.55 vs. M=161.92 seconds). F (1,150)=
67.44, 2<.001.
On subjects' self-reports of the relative amount of time they had
spent thinking about the communicator's characteristics versus his arguments,
both a consequences and an arguments effect were obtained. Subjects spent
more time thinking about the communicator's argumentation if they were in
high (vs. low) consequences conditions (M=8.84 vs. M=7.38). F(l. 150)=5
. 57
.
^< .05. and when they read massages containing six, rather than two, argu-
ments (M=9.06 vs. K=7.14), F(1.150)=10.37, £<.005.
Effects involving topic and sex . On the actual amount of time spent
reading the persuasive message, both the Sex X Topic and Likeability X
Topic interactions were significant (£'s<^.05). In terms of general trends,
male subjects and subjects exposed to likeable communicators tended to
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spend more time reading trimester (vs. sleep) messages, while female
subjects and subjects exposed to unlikeable communicators tended to spend
more time reading sleep (vs. trimester) messages.
Thoughts Generated by Exposure to the Persuasive Message
For each subject, the sum of thoughts in each of the 7 thoughts cate-
gories (C+, C-. Co, m-, M-, Mo, 0) was computed and the resulting indices
treated by analysis of variance. Because of its low reliability (r=.50)
and ambiguous theoretical status, findings obtained on the "Other" thoughts
measure are not reported. Analyses were also performed on the following
derived scores: (1) Total thoughts (T=IC+ +lc~ +lCo +ZMf +lM- +^o)
,
(2) Message- oriented minus communicator-oriented thoughts (ZMess
-^Com =
(2>H- +nM- +zlio) - (rc+ +^C- +rCo)), and (3) Positive minus negative
thoughts (2P0S
-?Neg = (IM+ i:C+) - +XC-)).^
Analyses on the communicator-oriented thoughts measures revealed that
the consequences main effect was significant on positive thoughts, _F(1»150)
4.95, £<.05, neutral thoughts
,
F(l,150) = 7.96, 2<.005, and marginally
significant on negative thoughts about the communicator, _F(1,150)=3. 32,
£=.07.: While high consequences subjects generated more positive communi-
cator-oriented thoughts than low consequences subjects (M=.61 vs. M=.3A),
low consequences subjects generated more negative thoughts (M=.90 vs. M=.5
and more neutral thoughts about the communicator (11=. 68 vs. M=.36). The
likeability effect vas significant on both positive communicator thoughts,
_F(1,150)=9
.83, £<'.0C5, and negative communicator thoughts, F(l,150) = 26.99,
£<.001: Subjects exposed to a likeable, rather than unlikeable, com.munica~
tor generated more positive thoughts (M=.63 vs. M=.22) and fewer negative
thoughts (M=.25 vs. M=1.33) about the communicator. An arguments effect
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on positive coimnunicator thoughts. F(l,150) = 8. 44. £<.005. and neutral
cominunicator thoughts. F(l. 150)=13.06. 2<.01, indicated that subjects
exposed to two (vs. six) arguments generated more positive and neutral
communicator-oriented thoughts (C+: M =.60 vs. M=.33; Co: M=.76 vs.M=.29).
On subjects' neutral communicator thoughts, both the Consequences X Argu-
ments interaction, F(1.150)=8.15.
^<.005. and the Consequences X Likeability
X Argum.ents interaction. F(1.150) = 7. 10. £<.01. were significant. In terms
of general trends, high consequences subjects expressed roughly the same
number of neutral communicator thoughts, regardless of level of arguments
or likeability. Low consequences subjects, however, tended to express
more neutral communicator thoughts when messages contained two (vs. six)
arguments, and this tendency was slightly more pronounced for subjects
exposed to likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicators.
On subjects' positive message-oriented thoughts a significant like-
ability effect, F(l,150)=5.30, £<.05, a significant arguments effect,
_F(1,150)=10.88, £<.001, and a marginally significant consequences effect,
_F(1,150)=3.62, £=.06, were obtained: More positive message-oriented
thoughts were expressed by subjects exposed to likeable (vs. unlikeable)
communicators (M=1.04 vs. M=.64); by subjects exposed to six (vs. two)
arguments (M=1.12 vs. M=.60); and by subjects in high (vs. low) consequences
conditions (M=1.01 vs. M=.71). On neutral message-oriented thoughts, only
the Consequences X Likeability X Arguments interaction was significant,
F_ (1,150)=4. 39, £^.05. High consequences subjects generated approximately
the same number of neutral message thoughts, regardless of likeability or number
of arguments received, while low consequences subjects tended to express
more neutral message thoughts if exposed to a likeable ccmnunicator who
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presented two (vs. six) arguments, or if exposed to an unlikeable co.nuni-
cator who presented six (vs. two) arguments.
An analysis of the sum of message-oriented minus communicator-oriented
thoughts index yielded a marginally significant consequences main effect,
F(L.150)-3.66, £=.06, indicating that high consequences subjects generated
relatively more message-oriented than communicator-oriented thoughts (M=1.25)
in comparison to low consequences subjects (M=.46). On the same measure,
mm effects due to likeabllity, F(l. 150)=6
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. £<.01, and the number of argu-
ments. F(l,150)=11.49,
^.001 were also obtained: Subjects expressed rela-
tively more message-oriented than communicator-oriented thoughts when the
communicator was likeable, rather than unlikeable (M=1.41 vs. M=.17), and
when six, rather than two, arguments were received (M=1.43 vs. M=.26). On
the sum of positive minus negative thoughts index, a consequences effect,
F(l,150)=4.68, £j^.05, and a likeability effect. F(l,150)=14.56, 2<.001, were
obtained: Low consequences subjects generated more negative than positive
thoughts (M=-.79) while high consequences subjects generated an equivalent
number of positive and negative thoughts (M=0.00); and subjects e:cposed to
unlikeable communicators expressed more negative than positive thoughts
(M=-1.34) while subjects exposed to likeable communicators generated more
positive thoughts (M=.39).
Effects involving topic and sex . Subjects exposed to trimester (vs.
sleep, messages, expressed significantly fewer negative message-oriented
thoughts, £<^.05, significantly more neutral message thoughts, £<.05, and
marginally more positive message-oriented thoughts, £=.07. The Arguments
X Topic interaction was significant on positive message-oriented thoughts,
2_^01, and on total thoughts generated, £^.05. Given trimester messages,
more positive message thoughts were expressed by subjects exposed to six
(vs. two) arguments, while given sleep messages, the number of positive
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message thoughts expressed was unaffected by number of arguments received.
With respect to total thoughts, given sleep messages, more thoughts were
generated in response to messages containing two (vs. six) arguments
while given trimester messages, the total number of thoughts expressed
was unaffected by the arguments variable. On a few of the thoughts mea-
sures, higher order effects involving the topic and/or sex variables were
also obtained. Due to their minimal relevance they are not discussed.
Message Comprehension
In addition to a significant manipulation check indicating greater
argument recall for subjects reading messages containing six, rather than
two, arguments, £<.001, the analysis on the recall measure yielded a
consequences main effect, F(l,150)=9.28, £<.005: High consequences
subjects recalled significantly more arguments (M=2.40) than did low con-
sequences subjects (M=1.98). However, the significant Consequences X
Arguments interaction, F(l, 150)=8. 00, 2<.005 indicated that the tendency
for high (vs. low) consequences subjects to recall more arguments was
most pronounced for messages containing six (vs. two) persuasive arguments.
Effects Involving topic and sex. Subjects recalled more arguments
when they read trimester, rather than sleep messages, 2<.001. In addition,
an Arguments X Topic interaction, £<.005, indicated that the overall
tendency for subjects exposed to six, rather than two, arguments to recall
riore persuasive arguments was most evident for subjects receiving trimester
(vs. sleep) messages. Finally, the Sex X Topic and Sex X Arguments X
Topic interactions were significant on argument recall (£'s^.05) but will
not be described due to their minimal relevance.
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Perception of the Communicator
A factor analysis (varimax rotation) of subjects' bipolar source
ratings yielded two rotated factors (see Table 4 for factor loadings).
^
Factor 1, which accounted for 55.8 percent of the total variance, was
labelled "Communicator Attractiveness". Variables loading highly on
this factor (factor loadings > .60) included warm/cold, likeable/unlikeable,
pleasing/annoying, friendly/unfriendly, approachable/unapproachable, and
modest/arrogant. Factor 2. which accounted for 10.2 percent of the variance,
was labelled "Communicator Expertise". Source traits loading highly on
this factor included knowledgeable/unknowledgeable, intelligent/unintelli-
gent, and competent/incompetent. Analyses were performed using subjects'
attractiveness and expertise facotr scores as dependent variables. The
trustworthy, sincere, and unbiased scales, which failed to load highly and/
or distinctively on either factor, were analyzed separately.
Insert Table 4 about here
The likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicator was perceived as more
attractive (M= -.68 vs. M+.75), F(l,150)=131.98, £<.001; more expert
(M= -.26 vs. M= +.24), F(l,150)=11.94, £< .001; more trustworthy (M=5.06
vs. M = 6.96), F (1,150) =24.48, 2<.00i; more sincere (M=4.70 vs. M=6.51),
F;(1,150)=10.20, £<.005; and less biased (M=7.06 vs. M=9.84),
_F(1,150) =
21,00, £<.001. A consequences main effect on sincerity, 1^(1, 150)=3 .99
,
£<^.05, showed that high consequences subjects perceived the communicator
as more sincere than did low consequences subjects (M=5.20 vs. M=5.84).
The Likeability X Arguments: interaction was also significant on the since-
rity ratings, _F(1,15C)=5.54, £< .05, and indicated that the tendency to
1
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regard the likeable (vs. unlikeable) coMnunicator as .ore sincere was
most pronounced for subjects exposed to two (vs. six) persuasive argu-
ments. Finally, the Consequences X Likeability interaction on the
unbiased scale, F(l,150)= 6.08. ^<.05. suggested that the overall tendency
to perceive the likeable (vs. unlikeable) conununicator as less biased was
most evident for low (vs. high) consequences subjects.
Effects involviag_^o2i^and^ The Arguments X Topic interaction
was significant on subjects' expertise factor scores, 2<.05: Given tri-
mester messages, the coinmunicator presenting six (vs. two) arguments was
perceived as more expert; while given sleep messages, perceptions of
expertise were unaffected by the arguments variable. On the trustworthi-
ness scale, the Consequences X Likeability X Arguments X Topic, the Sex
X Consequences X Arguments, and the Sex X Consequences X Arguments X Topic
interactions were significant (£'s<.05); and on the unbiased scale, the
Sex X Consequences X Arguments X Topic interaction was significant (£(^.05).
Because of their minimal importance, these effects are not discussed.
Other Dependent Variables
Subjects who read messages containing six, as opposed to two, persua-
sive arguments, rated the topic discussed in the message as more important,
£<'.001, reported a greater desire to be well informed on the message topic,
£^ .001, and reported exerting more effort in reading the message, £< .05.
No other effects involving the primary experimental variables were signi-
ficant on these measures and no effects were obtained on subjects' reported
interest in understanding the communicator's reasons for his overall posi-
tion,
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Mfe^t^nvolvin^^topi^a^^^^ Overall, subjects reading trimester
messages rated the message topic as .ore important than did subjects
reading sleep messages.
.005. However, the Consequences X Topic inter-
action.
^^.05. indicated that this overall tendency was limited to
subjects in low consequences conditions: lihereas low consequences
subjects rated the topic as more important when they received a trimester
(vs. sleep) message, high consequences subjects rated the message topic
as somewhat important, regardless of which message topic was received.
On the topic importance ratings, the Sex X Arguments and Sex X Arguments
X Topic interactions were also significant (£'s<.05 and < .01
.
respec-
tively). Finally, the Sex X Topic interaction was significant on subjects'
desires to be well informed on the message topic ,£<.05; and the Sex
X Consequences X Likeability X Topic interaction was significant on sub-
jects' effort ratings, £< .05. Due to their lack of theoretical interest,
these latter effects are not described.
Correlational Findings
Partial correlations (controlling for age) between both initial and
delayed opinion change and the remaining dependent measures are shown in
Table 5 for the total sample and for high and low consequences conditions
separately
.
Insert Table 5 about here
Correlations between the various source ratings and opinion change
were generally low and nonsignificant with the exception of subjects'
expertise ratings: Greater perceived expertise was associated with greater
initial opinion change for all subjects, and significantly associated with
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delayed change for high, but not low, consequences subjects.
For high consequences subjects, number of arguments recalled was
positively and significantly associated with both Initial and delayed
opinion change. For low consequences subjects, argument recall was not
significantly related to (initial or delayed) opinion change.
Correlations between the two opinion change measures and subjects'
communicator-oriented thoughts (C-h.C-,Co) were generally low in magnitude and
nonsignificant. On the other hand, subjects' positive and negative
message-oriented thoughts tended to be positively and negatively related
to opinion change, respectively. The correlations between these indices
and initial opinion change were significant within high consequences
conditions but marginal or nonsignificant within low consequences conditions.
The total thoughts index bore little relationship to initial opinion change
but was significantly related to delayed change when all subjects were
considered and also within high, but not low, consequences conditions.
Interestingly, this measure was negatively related to delayed opinion
change with lesser change associated with a greater number of expressed
thoughts. The message-oriented minus communicator-oriented thoughts index
was only weakly related to opinion change, no doubt because this index
combined positive and negative message-oriented thoughts which, indivi-
dually, bore opposite relationships with opinion change. Tlie sum of
positive minus negative thoughts index was significantly related to initial
and delayed opinion change for the entire sample and also within high,
but not low, consequences conditions: To the extent that subjects gene-
rated positive (vs. negative) thoughts, they exhibited greater opinion
change.
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The tine that subjects spent reading the message was positively
related to opinion change, although the relationship was low in magnitude
and reached significance only with delayed opinion change when data from
all subjects were considered. Subjects' self-reports of the amount of
time they had spent thinking about the communicator's characteristics
versus his argumentation was nonsignificantly related to initial opinion
change; but. for all subjects and within high, but not low. consequences
conditions, significantly more delayed opinion change was associated with
more time spent thinking about the communicator's argumentation. Opinion
change was not related to subjects' reported interest in reading the mes-
sage or the effort they reported expending while reading the message. On
the other hand, subjects' topic importance ratings and their reported
desire to be well informed on the message topic did relate significantly
to opinion change: Higher perceived topic importance and a greater desire
to be well informed on the message topic were associated with greater
initial and delayed opinion change.
To further explore the cognitive mediation of opinion change for sub-
jects in high and low consequences conditions, respectively, four mulciple
regression problems were performed. Problems 1 and 2 employed data from
high consequences subjects (N=89) and problems 3 and A utilized data from
low consequences subjects (N=94)
. Initial opinion change was the criterion
variable in problems 1 and 3 while delayed opinion change was the criterion
variable in problems 2 and 4. The following 11 predictor variables were
included in each of the four regression problems: Age, time spent reading
the message, self- reported time spent thinking about the communicator
versus the communicator's argumentation, attractiveness factor sources,
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expertise factor scores, nuinber of arguments recalled, number of positive
communicator-oriented thoughts, number of negative communicator
-oriented
thoughts, number of positive message-oriented thoughts, number of negative
message-oriented thoughts, and sum of positive minus negative thoughts.^
A. sumrr^ary of the results of these regression problems appears in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 about here
Prediction of initial opinion charge
. For high consequences subjects,
the only significant predictor of initial opinion change was the number
of positive message-oriented thoughts expressed.
_p<.05. Variables which
contributed to the prediction equation on a marginally significant basis
(£'s<.ll or smaller) included positive communicator-oriented thoughts,
negative message-oriented thoughts, and number of arguments recalled.
Within high consequences conditions, greater initial opinion change was
primarily associated with a greater number of positive thoughts about
the message, a lesser number of negative message thoughts, a lesser number
of positive communicator-oriented thoughts, and greater argument recall.
For low consequences subjects, the only variables which contributed
significantly (or niarginally significantly, for that matter) to the pre-
diction of initial opinion change were subjects' age. p<.005, and percei-
ved communicator expertise. j> < .05: Initial opinion change was positively
associated to subjects' age and positively associated with perceived
expertise.
Prediction of delayed opinion change . For high consequences subjects,
the only variable which significantly predicted delayed opinion change
1
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was the number of arguments recalled,
_p <. 05 . For low consequences
subjects, variables which contributed significantly to the predicion of
delayed opinion change included age,_p<
.01, positive communicator-
oriented thoughts, 05, and positive message-oriented thoughts
. _p<. 05.
Thus, within high consequences conditions, greater delayed opinion
change was primarily associated with greater argument recall; while,
within low consequences conditions, greater delayed opinion change was
primarily associated with increased age, and a greater number of posi-
tive message-oriented thoughts and a fewer number of positive communica-
tor-oriented thoughts generated at the laboratory session.
Because argument recall was a significant predictor of delayed
opinion change within high, but not low, consequences conditions and
thus a potential mediator of the significant consequences main effect
obtained on delayed opinion change (p <r.05), argument recall was entered
as a covariate (in addition to age) in an analysis of covariance on
delayed opinion change. This analysis revealed that covarying on argu-
ments recalled diminished the magnitude of the consequences main effect,
F(l,148) = 2.18, £ = .14.
Discussion
In the experiment, subjects read a persuasive m.essage under either
high or low perceived consequences conditions: While some subjects
(high consequences) read a message concerning the same topic which they
anticipated discussing and expressing their views on at a future experi-
mental session, oLher subjects (low consequences) read a message concer-
ning a dif feren 1: topic. The persuasive message was attributed to either
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a likeable or unlikeable communicator who presented either six or two
arguments supporting his overall position. The major experimental '
hypothesis was that the amount of argumentation provided would have a
greater impact on the initial opinion change shown by subjects in high,
in comparison to low, consequences conditions, while the communicator's
likeability or unlikeability would exert a greater impact on the initial
opinion change shown by subjects in low, in comparison to high, conse-
quences conditions.
The results obtained on subjects' initial opinion change scores
were generally compatible with the above hypothesis: Although the
overall differences between high and low consequences conditions were
statistically weak (neither the Consequences X Likeability nor Conse-
quences X Arguments interaction reached a conventional level of signifi-
cance in the analysis of variance), simple effects tests shov;ed that
within high perceived consequences conditions, the simple argum.ents
effect was significant (£ < .05) while the simple likeability effect was
nonsignificant (F<1.0); whereas, within low perceived consequences
conditions, the simple likeability effect was marginally si.sTiificcnt
(£ = .09) while the simple arguments effect was nonsignificant (F<1.0).
As shown in Figure 1, high consequences subjects exhibited significantly
greater initial opinion change in response to messages containing six,
rather than two, arguments, but not in response to messages from likeable,
compared to unlikeable, comsiunicators . On the other hand, low consequences
subjects exhibited, on a marginally significant basis, greater initial
opinion change in response to messages attributed to likeable, rather
than unlikeable, comraunicators , but not in response to messages containing
78
six, compared with two, persuasive arguments.
The above pattern of opinion change findings was postulated to be
the result of differing information processing strategies employed by
subjects in high and low perceived consequences conditions, respectively.
It was reasoned that subjects in high consequences conditions would be
highly motivated to be well informed on the issue discussed in the per-
suasive message and would therefore expend the cognitive effort required
to understand and carefully screen incoming persuasive argumentation so
as to arrive at some correct, valid, or defensible position on the message
topic. Thus, it was argued that these subjects would tend to form their
initial opinion judgments primarily on the basis of the argumentation
provided and would tend to use information regarding the communicator's
identity only as a secondary source of information in deciding whether
to accept the message's overall position. In contrast, it was reasoned
that subjects in low consequences conditions would have little stake in
being well informed on the topic of the persuasive message and would
therefore avoid expending the cognitive effort required to understand
and scrutinize incoming persuasive argumentation. Instead, it was argued
that these subjects, opting for a relatively simple information processing
strategy, would tend to form their initial opinion judgments primarily on
the basis of the readily accessible information they possessed regarding
the communicator's identity, and would tend to be relatively unaffected
by the amount of argumentation provided in the message.
Results obtained on other dependent measures generally supported the
notion that the cognitive mediation of opinion change differed for sub-
jects in high and low consequences conditions. Thus, subjects in high
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(vs. low) consequences conditions spent significantly more time reading
the persuasive message. In addition, high consequences subjects reported
spending more time during message exposure thinking about the communi-
cator's argumentation (vs. his personal characteristics) than did low
consequences subjects. Corroborating these self-reports, high (vs.
low) consequences subjects recalled significantly more persuasive argu-
ments
.
Regarding subjects' cognitive responses to the persuasive message,
although the consequences variable had no impact on the total number
of thoughts expressed by subjects, high consequences subjects tended to
generate relatively more message-oriented thoughts that communicator-
oriented thoughts in comparison to low consequences subjects (£=.06).
It should be noted, however, that low consequences subjects also gene-
rated more thoughts about the message than about the communicator, no
doubt because of the low overall frequency of communicator-oriented
thoughts expressed by subjects in com.parison to message-oriented thoughts
(P = .36 vs. = .58). IiJhen both type (message vs. communicator) and
valence (positive, negative, neutral) of thoughts were considered, no
clear-cut differences between high and low consequences conditions emerged
(see Results Section). However, when the proportion of communicator-
oriented and message-oriented thoughts (regardless of valence) were
analyzed, a clearer pattern emerged: High consequences subjects produced
a significanly higher proportion of message-oriented thoughts than did
low consequences subjects ( = .67 vs. = .53, £.<.05), while low con-
sequences subjects generated a marginally higher proportion of communi-
cator thoughts than did high consequences subjects (?_=,39 vs. P= . 32 ,£= . 11)
.
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Correlations between initial opinion change and other dependent'
measures were moderately consistent with the assumption that initial
opinion change for high consequences subjects would be mediated prima-
rily by their understanding of and/or cognitive reactions to the per-
suasive message content, while initial opinion change for low consequen-
ces subjects would be mediated primarily by their perceptions of the
communicator. Argument recall, and both positive and negative message-
oriented thoughts were significantly related to initial opinion change
within high consequences conditions. However, within low consequences
conditions, neither argument recall nor negative message: thoughts
related significantly to opinion change and the correlation between
positive message-oriented thoughts and opinion change only approached
significance (£< .10). Correlations between subjects' various communi-
cator-oriented thoughts (C+, C-, Co) and initial opinion change were
quite low and nonsignificant, even within low consequences conditions
where significance had been expected. Though somewhat discouraging,
the lack of a relationship within the latter conditions might be ascribed
to the possible insensitivity of these measures: Of the total number
of thoughts typically elicited from subjects (H=4.57), the proportion
of positive, negative, and neutral communicator-oriented thoughts tended
to be quite negligible (P^_^ = .10, P^_ =.16, P^^ =.10). Correlations
between subjects' source ratings and initial opinion change tended to
be low and nonsignificant. The one exception was perceived expertise
which was significantly related to initial opinion change within both
low and high consequences conditions, though the relationship was
somewhat stronger within low (£< .005), than within high (£<.05) conse-
quenceb conditions.
81
Multiple regression analyses also proved to be of some worth in
exploring the cognitive mediation of initial opinion change. Within
high consequences conditions, variables which were significant or
marginally significant predictors of initial opinion change represented,
with one exception (positive coimnunicator-oriented thoughts^^)
, content
based cognitions: Positive message-oriented thoughts, negative message-
oriented thoughts, and arguments recalled. Within low consequences
conditions, however, none of these variables predicted Initial opinion
change (p's>.28 or larger). Instead .aside from subjects' age, perceived
communicator expertise was the only significant predictor of initial
opinion change.
In summary, the findings on initial opinion change, though statis-
tically weak on an overall basis, were generally consistent with the
hypothesis that initial opinion change for subjects in high consequences
conditions would be strongly influenced by the amount of argumentation
presented but not by the communicator's likeability, while iniirial
opinion change for subjects in low consequences conditions would be
primarily influenced by the communicator's likeability rather than by
the amount of argumentation he presented. Further, the findings obtained
on argument recall, subjects' thoughts, and other measures, as well as
various correlational findings, generally supported the claim that high
consequences subjects would engage in a relatively detailed information
processing strategy in which content-oriented cognitions would trediate
initial opinion change, whereas low consequences subjects would engage
in a comparatively lew level information processing strategy in which
source-based cognitions would primarily mediata initial opinion change.
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Stability of Op im'nn rv.anc>o ^
As a secondary focus, the experiment explored the hypothesis that
content-mediated opinion change would tend to be more stabU over tim.
than source-mediated opinion change. This hypothesis was based on th(
floowing reasoning. First, it was assumed that belief or attitude change
with respect to some attitudinal topic should tend to persist to the
extent that it is bolstered by other topic-relevant cognitions. Second,
it was reasoned that individuals who adopt a belief primarily on the
basis of who the communicator is typically possess fewer topic-relevant
cognitive supports for their new belief than do individuals who adopt a
belief primarily on the basis of what the communicator says, since the
communicator's message typically consists of topic-related arguments or
evidence which serve to support the communicator's overall position.
Since there seemedlittle reason to expect thac, on an initial basis,
opinion judgments based primarily on content cues should be either more
or less favorable to the overall position advocated in the message than
opinion judgments based primarily on source cues, it was anticipated
that the (presumably content-mediated) initial opinion change shov/n by
high consequences subjects would not differ appreciably from the
(presumably source-Fxcdiated) initial opinion change exhibited by low
consequences subjects. However, based on the hypothesis that content-
mediated change would be more stable over time than source-mediated
change, it was predicted that the opinion change expressed by low conse-
quences subjects on the delayed opinion posttest would reveal a signifi-
cant decrement from that expressed on the initial opinion posttest, while
the opinion change expressed by high consequences subjects would show
83
little decline between posttests . "^"^
The opinion change findings provided qualified support for the above
predictions. I^e consequences main effect was nonsignificant in the
analysis of initial opinion change (£>.30) but was significant in the
analysis of delayed opinion change
.05): As illustrated in Figure
2. iimnediately after message exposure, subjects in high and low conse-
quences conditions exhibited roughly equal amounts of opinion change,
while (approximately) 10 days later, high consequences subjects manifested
significantly greater change than did low consequences subjects. Further,
although the Time of Assessment X Consequences interaction only approached
marginal significance (£<.15) in the repeated measures analysis of
opinion change, simple effects tests showed that opinion change decreased
significantly between posttests for subjects in low consequences conditions,
but remained virtually stable for subjects in high consequences conditiors.
Qualifying this finding somewhat, a significant Tine of Assessment X
Likeability X Consequences interaction on opinion change indicated that
the predicted differential persistence of opinion change for high and
low consequences subjects, respectively held only for subjects exposed
to messages attributed to likeable communicators. When the communicator
was unlikeable, neither high nor low consequences subjects exhibited a
significant decrease in opinion change between posttests. Though the
failure to observe a significant decay in opinion change for low conse-
quences subjects exposed to unlikeable communicators is somewhat dis-
couraging, close inspection of Table 3 suggests that this failure nay
have been due to a basement effect stemming from the fact that initial
opinion change in this condition w£:s extremely low.
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As noted earlier, the results on initial opinion change and other
measures as well as the results of multiple regression analysis using
initial opinion change as the criterion variable were generally consis-
tent with the notion that initial opinion change would be primarily
mediated by content-based cognitions within high consequences conditions
and by source-based cognitions within low consequences conditions.
Thus, the (tentative) finding that opinion change tended to decline
significantly over time for low consequences subjects but not for high
consequences subjects is generally consistent with the hypothesis chat
content-mediated (initial) opinion change would be more persistent than
source-mediated (initial) opinion change.
The results of multiple regression analyses using delayed opinion
change as the criterion variable revealed a different pattern of predic-
tion results from that obtained when initial opinion change was the
criterion variable. Within high consequences conditions, the only sig-
nificant predictor of delayed opinion change was the number of arguments
recalled — a set of content- related cognitions summarizing subjects'
retention of the communication content. Positive and negative message-
oriented thoughts — a set of content-related cognitions primarily
reflecting subjects' cognitive reactions to the communication content —
were not good predictors of delayed opinion change (£'s> .61 and p. 20,
respectively), though they had predicted initial opinion change. Within
low consequences conditions, however, age, positive communicator-oriented
thoughts (see footnote 10), and positive message-oriented thoughts were
significaat predictors of delayed opinion change (2.'s<.05). Neither
argument recall nor perceived expertise, a variable which had predicted
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initial opinion change (£<.05).were good predictors of delayed opinion
change (£'s>
.29 and > .18, respectively).
These regression findings are interesting with regard to understanding
persistence effects in persuasion. For both high and low consequences
subjects, delayed opinion change (unlike initial change) could, to son,e
extent, be predicted from subjects' content-oriented cognitions, although
for high consequences subjects, such cognitions reflected thei r retention
of the communication content (i.e. arguments) while for low consequences
subjects, such cognitions reflected, for the most part, their cognitive
reactions to the communication content (i.e. positive message-oriented
thoughts). Still, opinion change tended to decline between posttests for
low consequences subjects but remained stable for high consequences
subjects. These findings suggest that, contrary to those who have empha-
sized the greater importance of recipient generated responses.in explaining
persistence effects (cf., Greenwald, 1967), the recipient's retention
of communication content may play a larger role than the recipient's cog-
nitive reactions to communication content, in determining the perslntence
of opinion change. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the
significant consequences main effect on delayed opinion change (F(l,150)=
4.19, £<.05) was considerably reduced in strength when argument recall
was entered as a covariate (F(l, 148)=!''.
. 18
,
£=.14).
Comrimnicator Likeabilitv and Opinion Change
As noted earlier, the communicator's likeability had a stronger
impact on Iritial opinion change within low (vs. high) consequences condi-
tions. Houever, it was also true that on au overall basis, likeable
communicators induced significantly greater initial opinion change chan
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did unlikeable communicators.
It was proposed that the impact of communicator cues on (initial)
opinion chnage may often reflect the operation of relatively simple
rules or heuristics which guide the message recipient's decision to
accept (or reject) the communicator's overall position. With regard to
the likeability cue, it was suggested that individuals may often accept
(reject) the position advocated by a likeable (unlikeable) con«,mnicator
because of the simple rule or heuristic that "individuals generally agree
(disagree) with people they like (dislike)". It was also noted, however,
that agreement with a likeable communicator might also (or in addition)
be the product of other mechanisms, such as a desire to identify with a
liked source, a need to maintain cognitive consistency, or through a
simple conditioning process. Because the experiment was not designed
to discriminate between these source attractiveness mechanisms, they all
remain possible explanations for the likeability effects obtained in the
present study. In interpreting the results on opinion change and other
measures, however, some care should be exercised since, in the present
study, the likeable bommunicator was viewed not only as more attractive
than his unlikeable counterpart, but also as more expert, sincere, trust-
worthy, and unbiased. Thus, the impact of the likeability manipulation
on various dependent measures cannot be construed as reflecting the sole
impact of source attractiveness, unconfounded by other source dimensions.
Accompanying the significant impact of likeability on intial opinion
change, it was also found that subjects exposed to likeable (vs. unlikeable)
communicators generated mere positive and fewer negative thoughts about
the communicator, more positive message-oriented thoughts, more message-
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oriented thap comTnunicator-oriented thoughts, and more positive than
negative thoughts (regardless of orientation). That subjects exposed
to likeable (vs. unlikeable) coinmunicators generated more positive
message-oriented thoughts, suggests that, in addition to the attractive-
ness mechanisms noted above, the heightened persuasiveness of the likeable
communicator might also have been the product of subjects' positive
cognitive reactions to his message. The lack of a likeability main effect
on argument recall, time spent reading the message, or subjects' self-
reports of the time they spent thinking about the communicator's argumen-
tation (vs. his personal characteristics) suggests that, in accord with
previous research (Norman, 1976; Horai, Naccari, & Fatoullah, 1974; Snyder
& Rothbart, 1971), the impact of likeability on initial opinion change
cannot plausibly be attributed to any tendency for subjects to differen-
tially attend to or comprehend the content of the persuasive coirmunication.
Although communicator likeability exerted a significant impact on
initial opinion change, it had only a weak impact on delayed opinion change
,(£=.11). However, likeability did not interact with time of assess.neni-
^Hr-^the repeated measures analysis of opinion change (F< 1.0) which yielded
a marginally significant likeability main effect (£=.06). Regardless of
time of assessment, then, the likeable communicator tended to induce
somewhat greater opinion change than did the unlikeable comm.unicator
.
However, the fact that the likeability effect did dissipate somewhat
between opinion posttestSj is consistent with the observation that source
effects tend to erode over time (cf., Cook & Flay, Note 3; Giliig &
Greenwald, 197A>. Since in the present study, the likeability manipulation
seemed to have a lesser impact on variables presumed to reflect subjects'
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processing of the persuasive message (e.g., argument recall,
.essage-
oriented thoughts) and a greater impact on other variables (e.g.. commu-
nicator-oriented thoughts, other source ratings), the fact that the
likeability effect dissipated somewhat over time is also consistent with
the previously discussed hypothesis that source-mediated opinion change
tends to be less persistent than content-mediated opinion change.
Amount of Argumentation Received and Persuasion
In the experiment, the amount of persuasive argumentation provided
to subjects had an immediate and lasting impact on opinion change. The
arguments main effect was significant on initial opinion change, delayed
opinion change, and was also significant in the repeated measures analysis
of opinion change: Subjects showed greater opinion change vrhen exposed
to six (vs. two) persuasive arguments. While (as predicted) arguments
interacted (marginally) with the consequences variable on initial opinion
change, it did not interact with communicator likeability; and did not
interact with either likeability or perceived consequences on delayed
opinion change.
That the arguments effect on opinion change was, in fact, due to
the amount of argumentation received, rather than some other variable
(e.g., message length, effort expended reading the message) seems fairly
clear in the present study. The arguments effect on opinion change was
accompanied by a significant impact on argument recall. Further, covarying
on argument recall (in addition to age) greatly reduced the strength of
the arguments effect on opinion change so that it was rendered marginally
significant in an analysis of initial opinion change (o^=.14), nonsigni-
ficant in any analysis of delayed opinion change (F^^l.O), as well as
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nonsignificant in a repeated measures analysis of opinion change (^=.21).
In addition to its impact on opinion change and argument recall,
the amount of argumentation provided had a significant impact on a number
of other dependent measures: Subjects exposed to six (vs. two) persuasive
arguments spent more time reading the message, reported spending more
time thinking about the communicator'^ arguments (vs. his personal charac-
teristics), generated more message oriented than communicator-oriented
thoughts, expressed a greater desire to be well-informed on the message
topic, and considered the message topic more important. It is worth
noting that the arguments variable had no impact on subjects' perceptions
of the communicator.
The findings of the present experiment suggest that retention of
communication content may be a more important determinant of lasting opinion
change than of the individual's immediate response to persuasion. In a
regression analysis (using data from all subjects) employing initial
opinion change as the criterion variable, argument recall contributed
only marginally to the prediction equation (£=.08) while subjects' positive
message-oriented thoughts (£<.025), negative message oriented thoughts
(£=.06), positive communicator-oriented thoughts (£<.05), and perceptions
of communicator expertise (£^ .05) contributed somewhat m.ore strongly.
When delayed opinion change was the criterion variable, however, argument
recall was the strongest predictor of opinion change (£<.01), with nega-
tive message-oriented thoughts (£<.05), positive communicator-oriented
thcui^h C£<.05), and positive message-oriented thoughts (£-^.08) contri-
but:r.j^ less strongly to the prediction equation. Also, as noted earlier,
argur.ant recall appe::red to be a primary determinant of the fact that
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opinion change remained virtually stable between posttests for high
consequences subjects but declined significantly for low consequences
subjects
.
Effects of Sex and Topic
Subjects' sex had no significant impact on opinion change, either
alone or in combination with other experimental variables. Regarding
the topic variable, subjects who read trimester, rather than sleep, mes-
sages recalled more arguments, considered the message topic more important,
and generated more positive and neutral and fewer negative message-
oriented thoughts. Consistent with these findings, trimester messages
tended to elicit marginally greater opinion change than sleep messages.
Further, the Topic X Consequences X Likeability X Arguments interaction,
significant or marginally significant in the three analyses of opinion
change scores, indicated that the primary experimental variables exerted
a stronger impact on opinion change within trimester message conditions
than within sleep message conditions. Of potential concern was the fact
that on initial opinion change, where the 4-way interaction was marginally
significant, the patterning of means obtained within trimester conditions
tended to resemble more closely the overall (across topics) patterning
than did the patterning obtained within sleep conditions. However, the
one "apparent deviation" from the overall pattern observed within sleep
message conditions (see Figures IB and 3B and results section) represented
only a nonsignificant trend among means. Thus, while the overall findings
obtained on initial opinion change were paralleled much more closely
within trimestfcr than within sleep message conditions, the generality of
the overall initial opinion change findings do not appear to be seriously
coniprcmised by the observed topic differences.
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Summary and Conclusions
The results obtained on initial opinion change, though statistically
weak on an overall basis, as well as results obtained on other dependent
measures were generally compatible with the hypothesis that high conse-
quences subjects would engage in a relatively detailed information
processing strategy in which content-oriented cognitions would mediate
initial opinion change, whereas low consequences subjects would engage
in a comparatively low level information processing strategy in which
source-based cognitions would primarily mediate initial opinion change.
The present research thus supports the importance of the distinction made
between the systematic view of persuasion, with its emphasis on detailed
information processing and its focus on the role of content-based cogni-
tions in mediating opinion change, and the heuristic view of persuasion,
with its emphasis on relatively low-level information processing and its
focus on the role of simple rules or cognitive heuristics in mediating
the impact of non-content cues on opinion change.
While the opinion change findings obtained within low consequences
conditions were consistent with the view that the persuasive impact of
communicator likeability might reflect the operation of a simple cognitive
schema suggesting that "people typically agree with persons they like",
the present experiment provided no direct evidence to favor this simple
information processing explanation over other explanations for attractive-
ness effects in persuasion. Th-js, the attractiveness effects obtained
in the present study are also consistent with -the idea that people agree
with like communicators in order to emulate or identify with these cotumu-
nicators (Kelman, 1961), and also consistent with the idea chat people
agree with liked communicators in the interest of maintaining cognitive
consistency (Heider, 1958)
.
Future research might well address itself
more closely to exploring the mediation of attractiveness effects in
persuasion.
The findings of the present study were also moderately consistent
with the hypothesis that content-mediated opinion change would tend to
persist longer than would source-mediated opinion change: \^ile- opinion
change decreased significantly between the initial and delayed opinion
posttest for low consequences subjects, it remained virtually stable over
the 10 day period for subjects in high consequences conditions. Also of
importance to understanding persistence effects in persuasion was the
suggestive correlational finding that retention of communication content
was a better predictor of delayed opinion change than of initial opinion
change, while recipients' cognitive reactions to the persuasive message
predicted initial opinion change better than delayed opinion change.
Further research should attempt to provide more direct evidence regarding
the relative importance of retention of communication content and recipi-
ents' cognitive responses to the communication content as determinants of
immediate and lasting opinion change.
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TABLE 2
Opinion Change as a Function of Time of Assessn,ent, Perceived
Future Consequences, and Coinniunicator Likeability.
Likeable coiranunicator Unlikeable communicator
Time of
Assessmont
High
perceived
consequenc«is
Low
perceived
consequences
High
perceived
consequences
Low
perceived
conseqv'.'jnces
Initial 2.42 2.56 1,94 1.23
Delayed 2.67 1.61 1.61 1.05
tiOTE: C(2ll n's r£.nge from 40 to 50
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TABLE 5
Partial Correlations (controllinq for aae) betw^on Initial . ^Delayed Opinion Ch-.n.e and Other Copendont VariaMo o"iota?Sar-ple and High and low Consequonces Conditions r.pJrftcly!
Total Sar'ple (n=L83)
Initial
opinion
chancre
Delayed
opinion
changg
Source Rating
Trustworthy
Sincere
Unbiased
Attractiveness
Expertise
-.13 /
-.05
-.07
-.14/
-. 26**»»
-.07
-.12
-.02
-.12
-.22***
Hijh Consonuonc^gjn^fiO)^ Lo^ ConsonuencMr,=89)
'^'^^'-'e^ Initial Delayed
Initial
opinion
change
.-.10
-.11
-.03
-.17
-.25*
opinion
cl'.ange
-.14
-.20
-.02
-.22*
-.25*
opinion
change
.14
.00
.10
.10
.29***
opinion
change
.02
-.03
-.02
.02
-.13
Coinprehnssicn and Thoucrhts
Argument recall
C+ thoughts
C-
CP
M+ "
M-
Mo
Total thoughts
^Mess.-ycon.X't-,>
Other Dependent Measures
Tiitif? spent
reading ir.ossage
.12
Self-reported
time thinking
about comnuricator
(vs, foasonsl
.03
Topic irmrtanco
-.26****
Desir^i to be
Vvell laiorrned
_,27****
Int.'^r^iat
-.10
Effnrr.
-.08
18* ,27****
.26*
06
-.09
-.0,1
05
-.12
-.10
02
-.09
-.08
32****
_
29****
.41****
25*** *
-.22***
-. 32***
CI
-.06
.05
03
-.15*
-.11
08
.11
.15
25****
.
25* ***
.
34***
,18*
.21**
.
27****
.11
.07
.14
.09
_ 4 2* * * *
.
30***
. 13
.09
.30***
.08
.23*
,09
,
26*
.on
25*
18^
25*
,16
.24*
.
25*
.20/
.17
.09
.06
.17/
-.10
-.16
.03
.05
.01
-.08
. 20^
.
29**
-.16
-.22*
-.03
-.15
.OT
-.05
.01
.01
. 14
.19 y
.07
.15
-.05
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Fiqure 1
A. Initial Opinion Change as a Function of Coirmunicator Likeabilitv
and Perceived Future Consequences
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Initial Opinion Change as a Function of NoiPiier of Arguinents
Presented and Perceived Future Consecjuences
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Figure 2
Opinion Change as a F;inction of Time of Posttestand Perceived Future Consequences
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Figure 3
Sleep message
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B. Initial Opinion Change as a Function of Number of Arguments Presented and
Perceived Consequences for Sleep and Trimester Conditions
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Dependent Measures
Initial Opinion Measure
Initials
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE
Directions
: The purpose of this questionnaire is to get your preliminaryopinions on the topics which will be discussed in disLsion groups pILseread e^ statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with It.
aw'the'^"l''''°"'\'? ^'^^'^"S appropriate numberlong the scale given below the item. Lower numbers indicate stronger
agreement. Higher numbers indicate stronger disagreement.
1. All students, faculty, and staff should be required to take a yearly
medical e::amination at the University Health Service.
/ ^ • ^ • 3 / 4 : 5 : 6 / 7 : 8 ; 9 / 10 : 11 : 12 / 13 : 14 ; 15 /
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disaoree
strongly moderately agree nor moderately strongly
disagree
2. Students should be required to write an undergraduate thesis in the-^r
major field.
/ 1 • 2 : 3 / A ; 5 : 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 ; 11 ; 12 / 13 ; 14 ; 15 /
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree
strongly moderately agree nor moderately strongly
disagree
3. People should sleep much less than the typical average of 3 hours
per night.
/ 1 ; 2 ; 3 / 4 ; 5 ; 6 / 7 ; 8 ; 9 / 10 ; 11 : 12 / 13 ; 14 ; 15 /
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree
strongly moderately agree nor moderately strongly
disagree
4. The University should switch from its current two-semester system to
a trimester system.
/ 1 : 2 : 3 / 4 : 5 ; 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 ; 11 ; 12 / 13 : 14 ; 15 /
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree
strongly moderately agree nor moderately strongly
disagree
5. Coffee drinking should be considered as a recognised health hazard.
/ 1 : 2 ; 3 / ^ : 5 : 6 / 7 ; 3 : 9 / 10 : 11 : 12 / 13 : 14 ; 15 /
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree
strongly moderately agree nor moderately strongly
disagree
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Other Measures
Initials___
REACTIONS TO OPINION INTERVIEW
Transcript
// Tape # Subject //
I. Instructions: List below your thoughts and ideas about what theperson who was interviewed said during his/her interview. Writedown anything that occurs to ycu. State your thoughts and ideas
concisely
- a phrase is sufficient. You will have THREE MINUTES to
write down your ideas. Please stop writing immediately and go on tothe next page when told to do so. Do not go on if vou fini^^h early.
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Idea_
Id2a_
Idea_
Idea
STOP. DO NOT GO ON TO NEXT PAGE UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO.
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Warm vs. cold
^^T sS^S^rtS^ Uncertain S^J^ShST^'-^^T"^
cold
Knowledgeable vs. unknowledgeable
^
^
• ^ / ^ • ^ • 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 : 11 : 12 / 13 : 1 ^ : 15 /Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhatknowledge- knowledge- unknowledge- unknLledge-
^^^^
^^1^ able able
Modest vs. arrogant
^ ^ • ^ • 3 / 4 : 5 : 6 / 7 = « r Q / t o : 11 . 12 / 1-^ ; 14 . 15 /very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat V^^^;^
modest modest arrogant arrogant
Intelligent vs. unintelligent
/ 1 ; 2 : 3 / 4 ; 5 ; 6 / 7 ; 8 : 9 / 10 : 11 ; 12 / 13 ; 14 : 15 /Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat
intelligent intelligent unintelligent unintelligent
Approachable vs. unapproachable
/ ^ •• 2 • 3 / 4 : 5 : 6 / 7 : 8 ; 9 / 10 : 11 ; 12 / 13 : 14 : 15 /
Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Vary
approach" approach- unapproach- unapproach-
able able able able
Competent vs. incompetent
/I
: 2 : 3 / 4 ; 5 ; 6 / 7 : 8 ; 9 / 10 : 11 : 12 / Ij ; 14 ; 15 /
Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Very
competent competent incompetent incompetent
Likeable vs. unll.keable
/ 1 : 2 : 3 / 4 ; 5 : 6 / 7 ; 8 : 9 / 10 : 11 ; 12 / 13 ; 14 : 15 /
Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Very
likeable likeable unlikeable unlikeable
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8. Trustworthy vs. untrustworthy
\/ ^ • 3 / A : S ; / 7 ; 8 : 9 / 10 ; 11 : 1 7 / 13 • n • 15 /
7/F^^~ ^^^^t U^^^ l^n Somewhat v;ry 'trustworthy trustworthy untrustworthy untrustworthy
9. Pleasing vs. annoying
^ ^ •
^
• ^ ^ ^ = 5 • ^ / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 : 11 ; 1? / 13 : 14 • 15 /Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat
pleasing pleasing annovino •& y g annoying
10. Sincere vs. insincere
./ 1 ; 2 ; 3 / 4 : 5 ; 6 / 7 ; 8 : 9 / 10 ; 11 : 1? / 13 . 1^ . /Very Somewhat Uncertain S^;;S;it V^^^;^
sincere sincere insincere insincere
11. Friendly vs. unfriendly
^ ^ \^ • 3 / A : 5 : 6 / 7 : 8 : Q / in . 11 : 12 / 13 : 1^ , /Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Ver^
friendly friendly unfriendly unfriendly
12. Unbiased vs. biased
/ ^ • ^ • 3 / 4 : 5 : 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 ; 11 : 12 / 13 ; 14 ; 15 /
Ve ry S omewhat Uncertain Somewhat Very
unbiased unbiased biased biased
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III.
2. Write down as exactly as von r.n. the overall position expressed bvthe person being intervewed on his/her topic:
y
3. Write down a brief summary of each of the reasons which you can
recall that the person being interviewed used to support his/her
overall position on his/her topic:
IV.
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1.
3.
4.
How important do you think the topic is which was discussed ininterview transcript that you read?
the
/ 1 : 2 : 3 / A^5_ .: 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 . n : u / 13 : 14 .15 /
,
Soniewhat N^Ehl^ S^hlE vervimportant important important unimportant unimportant
nor unimportant
To what extent would you like to be well informed on the topic wh^chwas discussed m the interview transcript that you read?
f-^^ • 3 / A : 5 : 6 / 7 ; R ; 9 / 10 ; 11 : 12 / . 14 : 15 /To a very To a large To a moderate To a little T^ a verygreat extent extent extent extent little extent
How interested were you in attempting to understand the reasons giverby the person interviewed in support of his/her overall position oniiis/ner topic?
f
^ '
'2-
' !
A
: 5 ; 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 : 11 ; 12 / 13 : 14 : 15 /Very Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat V^^^interested interested uninterested uninterested
How much effort did you put into reading the interview transcript?
/ 1 ; 2 ; 3 / 4 ; 5 : 6 / 7 : 8 ; 9 / 10 ; 11 ; 12 / 13 ; 14 ; IW
A great deal A moderate Uncertain A little A very little
—
of effort amount of effort effort effort
5. While reading the interview transcipt, did you tend to spend more
time thinking about the person being interviewed and his/her charac-
teristics or more time thinking about the reasons given for the
person's overall position on his/her topic?
/ 1 ; 2 ; 3 / 4 ; 5 ; 6 / 7 : 8 : 9 / 10 ; 11 : 12 / 13 : 14 : 15 /
Much more Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Much more time
time think- more time more time thinking about
ing about thinking thinking about the reasons
the person about the the reasons
person
6. Any other comments about the transcript that you re^.d?
Phcne Instrument Used to Assess Delayed Opinions
PHONE FOLLOWUP
CONTAC?^^^.?;?^'^'''
I^^'^^^"^^). I am calling for ProjectTACl. a student survey project being conducted by a survey researchgroup in the psychology department. This semester, we've beL pouInestudents about how they feel about various aspects of uSss Ufe! ^o-'
ttt LT °^ students' feelings about various aspec s of
feelinir^'J
structure here at UMass and, in addition, on s'.udlnts'ings and opinions about physical and psychological ^ell-being?
name iTll Zl IT T "^^"^ '"^""'"^ ^^^^ °^ tonight's sample Your
Sould iou liJ responses are confidential,w > m nd answering a few questions for us?
^*
n5%^°\^T°T^''^
questions concern your feelings about various aspectsot the University structure here at Ullass.
1. How do you feel about the size of the average undergraduate class
at UMass?
1. Definitely too large
2. Just about the right size
3. Definitely too small
2. In general, how would you rate the overall quality of teaching at
UMass?
1. High quality
2. Average quality
3. Low quality
Please rate your agreem.ent with the following three questions (explain
agreemeiat scale)
.
3. There should be a much closer administrative relationship between the
Amherst and Boston campuses of UMass.
1. Definitely agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Definitely disagree
4. The University sould expand the size of its professional schools
(e.g. medical, law).
(same scale as above)
5. The University should change over to a trimester system.
(same scale as above — code S's response.)
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oLir^? TT ^"^f feelings and opinions aboutphysical and psychological well-being.
6.
attention?
semester have you gone to the health center for medical
1. 5 or more times
2. 3-4 times
3. 1-2 times
4. Haven't been
7.
7
How satisfied are you with the Mental Health services on campus
1. Definitely satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Definitely dissatisfied
5. Don't know
Please rate your agreement with the following 3 questions (again, explain
agreement scale)
.
8. Artificial sweeteners such as saccharin should be banned as the Food
and Drug Administration has suggested.
1. Definitely agree
2
.
Somex>7hat agree
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Definitely disagree
9. People should not be allowed to smoke in lecture courses at UMass.
(same agreement scale as above)
10. People should sleep less than the usual 8 hours a night,
(same scale code S's response)
III.
1. Have you been in any similar surveys this past semster? (code for
suspicion)
2. Thank you for participating in this survey.
Interviewer:
Mr. MSKS^S^i
Interviewer:
Mr, i^T^fihfff
Interviewer
:
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Interview Transcripts
Page 1, Version 1
(Likeable communicator, Sleep topic)
of segments of the camous community view certain r^niH ! J t
"""^^er
li:r:oit'\Ti ^ichr:;;;°x?rii::^ri'n e^^ew
IZ't. Z / """^ '"^''^ "^'^^^S of your opinion on the tonic
vUh yourassi^LTH-'"" ^'^^ interview, you'll b m : g
ve eet on wf th'^H
^"^^
^^^^ across the hall. Beforeg it the interview, though, why don't you give me a littlebackground information about yourself?
Let's see.—I've worked at the Student Affairs office for the pasteight years. My job concerns various non-academic asoects of Universitylife and one of my cr>ajor responsibilities is to work with undergraduates
who represent various student organizations on canous
. . .We 11 , I don'tknow what else to add-i'm married and I've got two children.. I'm 35. ..
1 don t really have any hobbies to speak of but I do read a fair ar.ount
OK. By the way, how do you like working with undergraduates?
Well as a matter of fact, I really enjoy it a lot. When I first started
my job here at the University I was a little apprehensive about the ideaOf working so much with undergraduates. Over the years, however, I've
realized that my apprehension was unjustified. The undergraduates who
I ve met both in my work with various student organizations and in other
•ettlngs as well strike me as being pretty responsible and mature. They're
really concerned, I think, with their role in society, i don't know of
course but sometimes I think that the public too often underestimates
the ability and maturity of today's college student. They just don't give
undergraduates enough credit. Anyway, it's no wonder that I continve to
do the work that I do... For me, working with undergraduates has been
pretty rewarding.
Oh that's interesting.
.. .Now, as you were told earlier, the main purpose
of this interview is to get a more in depth reading of your opinion on
the topic which you've been assigned. Let's see your topic was whether
or not people should sleep less than the typical average of 8 hours per
olght. l-iTiat I'd like you to do now is to state your opinion on this
topic and then to go on and tell me some or your reasons for holding
that opinion. Are there any questions?
Mr. 4S/9^HSi: No, I'q clear on what to do.
Interviewer: OK then, why don't you just start. Please try to speak clearly into
the recording equipment.
Interviewer:
Mr.
Interviewer:
Mr. ^SZSJi»:
Interviewer;
•
. ..
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Page 1, Version 2
(Unlikeable communicator, Sleep topic)
Jn'klf;t^^',rin'::.::L%Tn:: -Pen^ental session,
discuss their views with one aaothe'r. "ght t?.you in order to ^et a nore in ri»^t-w j * ^ ^^""^ ^° interview
you've been assigned to discuss ^ Af ^r th' °
"'''"^^^ °" ^'^^
-ctlng with your assign d i :sstonro'p\i\'h"'''"'
Before we get on with th^ fnrll I f ^'^'^^^ ^he hall,
little backgroL'bout yoirs'nr^*
''''''''
^ivo .e a
eleht ye"::"Vir;r^' " ''"'^"^ ^^^'^^^ past
life an'r;
; of r"e":o::ibirit"°'''"'^^'^ °^ ^-'^-"^^^
OK. By the way. how do you like working with undergraduates?
nll't startr^"'^-°K ' "'^^y When I
about th!
university I was a little apprehensivee idea of working so much with undergraduates. Over the yearl
ihl undT /'I' ' J''"^ apprehension has been W tif ^d
'
organlzat ons and m other settings as well strike me as being orettyirresponsible and i::^atare too. They're really unconcerned. I think'
ttlJtltl ^K 'l'°'''''y' I
^-'^ know of course out so.^ti.es I
'
hink that the public too often overes t inmates the ability ana maturityOf today s college student. They give undergraduates nore credit thanthey deserve. Any.7ay, sometimes I wonder why I continue to do the work
I do... For me, working with undergraduates really hasn't been very
rewarding. ^ ^
Oh— Chat's interesting.... Now, as you were told earlier, the main
purpose of this interview is to get a more in depth reading of vour
opinion on the topic which you've been assigned. Let's see your
topic was whether or not people should sleeo less than the typical
average of 8 hours per night.
-—'.;hat I'd like you to do now is to
•tote your opinion on this topic and then to go on and tell me some
of your reasons for holding that opinion. Are there any questions?
Mr. M.3:*sst: No, I'm clear on what to do.
Interviewer: OK t!\en, why don't you just st?rt.
the recording equipment.
Please try to speak clearly into
*
Interviewer
;
Mr.
Interviewer;
Mr. £t^f^.t,ii ;
Interviex^er
;
Mr.
Interviewer;
Page 1, Version 3 112
(Likeable commimicator
, Trimester topic)
In^thif;t'^7^^' ""^ ^^"t experimental scssloa
or segments of the canpus conununity view certain topics and how thevdiscuss the.r vic-.s with one another. ,1i,ht now. like to Interview
vo^i: be '^^'^^ °^ your opinion ^n Jh^^ ^icy u ve en assigned to discuss. After this interview. vou'U be reetinevith your assigned discussion group in the roo:. across'the ha 1 B fore'
hLf ; i^^-rview. though, why don't you give me a 1 ttlebackground information about yourself?
-I've worked at the Student Affairs office for the past
Let ' s see
,
eight years. My job concerns various non-acadamtras^ec ts orUniCersitylife and one of my major responsibilities is to work with undergraduatesWho represent various student organizations on camous
. . .Well I don'tknow what else to add--l'm married and I've got two children!
.I'm 35
I don t really have any hobbies to speak of but I do read a fair amount".
OK. By the way, hen; do you like working with undergraduates?
Uell. as a matter of fact, I really enjoy it a lot. When I first r-tarted
my job here at the University I was a little apprehensive about the idea
of working so much with undergraduates. Over the years, however. I've
realized that ay apprehension was unjustified. The undergraduates who
I ve met both in my work with various student organizations and in other
settings as well strike me as being pretty responsible and nature. They're
really concerned, I think, with their role in society. I don't know of
course but sometimes I think that the public too often underestimates
the ability and maturity of today's college student. They just don't give
undergraduates enough credit. An^-way, it's no wonder chat I continue to
do the work that I do... For me, working with undergraduates ha;
pretty rewarding.
03 en
Oh that's interesting.
.. .Now, as you were told earlier, the main purpose
of this interview is to get a more in depth reading of your opinion on
the topic which you've been sssi<:ned. Let's see your topic v/as
vhether or not the University should switch from its current two-semester
system to a trimester system. What I'd like you to do now is to state
your opinion on this topic and then to go on and tell rre some of your
reasons for holding that opinion. Are there any questions?
No, I'm clear on what to do.
OK then, why don't you just start,
the recording equipment.
Please try to speak clearly into
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Interviewer;
Mr. ^Ssf*
Interviewer:
Mr. pjsr^^sa;
Interviewer;
Page 1, Version A
(Unllkeable coimnunlcator. Trimester topic)
''i^-''^^ifs^^1^ experimental session.
Of segment, of the ca.pu:":::unuA:er::
^ain t"'""".' ttheir views witt. one another. Ri^^t ^ow ?'d J^v ^ f ^^^^ '^^"'^^order to get a more in depth reading of ^ ^"^^^^i^'-' y°u inbeen assigned to discuss After hf. f
^^^^^Pi^i^" on the topic you've
your assigned discus ion*.riup"n Jie ^00"'""' '""t ""'^"^ withget on with the interviL th! u t "^'^.^"oss the hall. Before we
background about'ourlelf ? ' ' ^ ^ ^^"1^
eight ;::;;'"'Mr "rl"' '"^ ""'^^^ ^^e past
life ard ofJ L rresL:"H°r."°""'"'^'^'^ "^^^^^^ ^''-er.ity
vho represent ^arL^^-r:-^^
know what else to add-I'. married and I've got two ch r:n' vl z^I don t really have any hobbies to speak of but I do read a f;Jr am;;;:;*
OK. By the way. ho./ do you like working with undergraduates?
^irst startrrmr-°s' k'''' ' 'r''
"^''^^ ^"^^^^ ^^^en I
about tie ?d^.
University I was a little apprehensiveh i ea of working so much with undergraduates. Over the yearsI m sorry to say, I think that my apprehension has been justified Theundergraduates who I've
-met both in my work with various stuSt
organizations and in other settings as well strike me as being prettyIrresponsible and irx^.ature too. They're really unconcerned, 1 Link.
^^^^ ""u^'
society. I don-t know of course but sometimes Ithink that the public too often overestimates the ability and maturity
of today s college student. They give undergraduates more credit thanthey deserve. An%vay, sometimes I wonder why I continue to do the work
I do... For me, working with undergraduates really hasn't been very
rewarding. '
Oh-— that's interesting Now, as you were told earlier, the main
purpose of this interview is to get a more in depth reading of your
opinion on the topic which you've been assigned. Let's see Your
topic was whether or not the University should switch from its current
two-semester system to a trimester sys ten. --What I'd like yiu to do now
is to state your opinion on this topic and then to go on and tell me some
of your reasons for holding that opinion. Are there any questions?
No, I'm clear on what to do.
Interviewer: OK then, why don't you just start,
the recording equipment.
Please try to speak clearly into
Page 2, Version 1
Mr. 4PSD!$3fi^:
Interviewer;
Mr.
Interviewer
:
Mr.
Interviewer;
(Sleep message: Two arguments version, rendition 1)
feel'the'waV';:: ^°
^^"^
"^'^ ^or why you
OK.. .Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about how I felt on thistopic I've tried to think pretty carefully about whv I feel'his
Of ;:'Iett?n°";
'"""^^
^^^^^"^^ ^° - ^^^^ead
^fd onf hatS rr^'"' ' " ^'^^ ^ ^^^"^ interesting•a ne t t I think I know something about...—One reason why I feel
S!/.^ \t°-''' ^^"^ °" '^^'^^ P^°P^^ "'^ be trained too^ximize their REM, you know rapid eye movement sleep, which is reallythe most important phase of sleep that people need. This can be done.If I remember correctly, through a program where you take a couple of
naps per day
...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Well, yes.
..I was just thinking a minute
., .Well , a somewhat different
reason for my opinion cores from some sleep research that's boen pretty
widely reported-i'm not sure where I heard about it. Anyway, it seems
that this physiological sleep research has shown that long periods of
sleep are associated with increased rates of heart disease and, I think
also, other kinds of physical ailments
--I guess those are my major
reasons, I can't really think of anything else right now..
OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus far
In our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the
hall. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over
there. The others should also be finished with their interviews by
now and are probably drifting in.
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Mr. ^SSSSima:
Interviewer;
Mr. JC^amm:
Interviewer:
Mr. £C^S»i
Interviewer;
Page 2, Version 2
(Sleep message: Two arguments version, rendition 2)
Well, of course 1 realize that oeople My differ sllghtlv on an
Individual basis, but overall. I'd have Co say that In my opinion
people should sleep much less than the typical average of 8 hours
per night.
Fine. 1*11 just let you go ahead now with your reasons for why you
feel the way you do.
OK....Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about how I felt on this
topic, I've tried to think pretty carefully about why I feel this
way... You know, even though the sleep topic was assigned to me instead
of me getting to choose it. it's a topic that I think is interesting
and one that I think I know something about... One reason for my
opinion Is based on the fact that the amount of sleep that people
get per night varies between different cultures--I remember reading
about that years ago. What I guess I'm saying, then, is that the
•mount of time that people spend sleeping is really kind of arbitrary.
It's like a habit and it's not as If we really need a certain amount..,
...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute.
. .Well , a somewhat different
reason comes from this research finding I heard about--! don't
remember where--that most people who have shifted from sleeping 8 cr
more hours per night to less than 8 hours per night tend to report
that they feel better physically and are more alert mentally..
I guess those are ray cajor reasons, I can't really think of anything
. else right now..
;
^
OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus far
In our study. Your discussion group Is meeting in the room across
the hall. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go
over there. The others should also be finished with their interviews
by now and are probably drifting In.
Hr.
Page 2, Version 3
(Sleep Tnessase: six ar8u„,e„ts version, tendltlon 1)
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Mr. 4l»eS3»9P; OK....Well, since I knew you'd be askini;; me about how I felt on thistopic. I ve trred to think pretty carefully about vhy I feel this
n?^::•''°^^^°'':
"^"'^
''^P^^ ^-^^ "^isned to me instead
IL I ^ .1 .\ V.^?"""^ ' " '^^"^ I "^^^i"!^ i5 Interestingand one that I think I know something about...—one reason whv I reel
luli^'^Ll
is based on the fact that people can be trained to maximizetne r RLM, you know rapid eye movement sleeo, which is really the mostImportant phase of sleep that people need. This can be done, if I
remember correctly, throu-h a program where you take a couple of napsper day.... You know, another reason why I feel the wav I do is based
on this survey I remember reading about once in one of the weekly news
magazines. I remember that the survey found that lots of successful
people. Including artists, writers, scientists, even athletes, tend to
8*eep a lot less than S hours a nicht Another study that I rememberhearing about brings up a related point. The study, which was the
report of an experiment, I think, divided people into those who slept
an average of 8 hours a night and those who slept an average of 6 or
»o hours per night. Then they had these people perform in the experiment
on lots of tasks that are supposed to measure hew well you perform on
Intellectual-type problems. The thing that they found which stuck in
my tnlnd was that the people who slept 6 hours a night did much better
on the tests than the people who slept 8 hours
Interviewer:
..Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Mr. |£«253^: Well, yes.
..I was just thinking a minute.
. .Veil , I do rememoer hearing
aonewnere, I can't remember where, that most people who have shifted from
sleeping 3 or more hours a night to less than 8 hours tend to report
that they feel better physically and are more alert mentally....! guess
a related point coir.es from some sleeo research that's been pretty widely
reported. It seems th^t this physiological sleep research has shewn that '^'''^
long periods of sleep ar« associated with increased rates of heart
disease and, I t'.iink also, other kinds of physical ailments Let's
see. Well, oh yes. One other and I guess somewnat different reason for
vhy I feel this v/ay is based on the fact th:it the amount of sleep that
people get per night varies between different cultures--! rencaber reading
about that years ago. Wh:3C I guess I'm saying, then, is that the amount
of time that people spend sleeping is really kind of arbitrary, it's like
a habit and its not as if we really need a certain amount I guess those '
are cajor reasons, I can't really think of anything else right now..
Interviewer: OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank ycu for participating thus far In our
Study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the hall. Why
don't you take a sliorc break if you'd like and then jro over there. The
Others should jIso be finished with thcl;' Interviews by now and are
probably uriftins in.
\
Mr.
Mr.
Page 2, Version 4
(Sleep message: Six arguments version, rendition 2)
peopU^sHouU Sleep .ucH less'cHa^ cHe
.tL^e" Z I'lZl
interviewer: ^U^^ let ,ou ,o a.ea. no. witH .our .easo. for ,ou
OK.. ..Well, since I knew you'd be asking n,o about how I felt cn this
Of ;;'Iettir; ''t ^^^^ ^^^S-^ - instead
!L ^^ u l'"^ ^ ^^^"^ I "^^i^k is interesting
•
nd one that I think I know something about...—One reason whv Ifeel the way I do is based on this survey that I remember reading aboutonce in one of the weekly news magaziaes, I don't remember which'one.Anyway, I remember that the survey found that lots of successful
people, including artists, writers, scientists, even athletes, tend to
sleep a lot less than 8 hours a night.
...i would sav that another
reason for ray opinion comes from the fact that pcoole can be trained
to maximize their REM. you know, rapid eye movement sleep, which is
really the most important phase of sleep that people need. Ihis can
be done, if I remember correctly, through a program where you take a
couple of naps per day I think that a different kind of reason
comes from some sleep research findings that have been pretty widely
reported. It seems that this physiological sleep research has shown
that long periods of sleep are associated with increased rates of
heart disease and, I think also, other kinds of physical ailments
Interviewer:
..Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Mr. ffi^^te*: Well, yes...I was just thinking a minute.
. .Well
, I do remember hearing
somewhere, I can't remember where, that most people who have shifted
from sleeping S or more hours a night to less than 8 hours, tend to
report that they feel better physically and are more alert mentally..
—
I guess that another and also pretty different reason for why I feel
this way comes from the fact that the amount of slee;> Chat people eet
per night varies between different cultures--! remember reading about
that years ago. What I guess I'm saying then, is that the amount of
time that people spend sleeping is really kind of arbitrary, it's like
a habit and it's not as if we really need a certain amount Let's
,
•ee..Well, oh yes. One other reason comes from this other srudy I
remember hearing about. The study, which was the report of an
experiment, I think, divided people into those who slept an average of
6 hours a night and those who slept an average of 6 or so hours per
night. Then they had these people perform in the experiment on lots
of task? that are supposed to measure how well you perform cn intellectual-
type problems. The thing they found that stuck in my mind was that
the people who slept 6 hours a night did much better on the tests Chan
the pwopi.j who slept 8 hours I guess chose are my major reasons,
I can't really think of anything else right now.
Interviewer: OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for partlc Ipatlnp thus far in
our study. Your discussion group Is meeting in the room across the
h^ll. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and Chen go over
there. Tha ochcrs should also be finished with their Interviews by now
ead sre probably drifting in.
•
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Page 2, Version 5
(Trln,ester message: Two arguments version,
-rendition 1)
jthL' ;r";%jir.r"=
-
interviewer: ^^-^n^^^ Ut e.ee. „„,
,„
OK. Well, since I knew you'd be a^^ns me about how I felt on tbi.
^11 \l I '° ^""^ "-^^^ly cbout why I feel U> J
Tnli::T% ' '^""^^ trinester topic was assigned to LI stead of mc petting to choose it. it's a topic that I crtnk isInteresting and one that I think I know so.ethin. abouJ ^--oie
Jni^e^'J^' I ' '° ^^"^ - economic a 'xhe
SuS a ^'ril^ter' '^""''^ ^'^"^ ^-duatc students in the suler.
tiev'd ' "'-^^'^ -^^^^ economical sinceh y be used all year round by more people
Interviewer:
...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Mr.«^: well yes I was just thlnkins a minute
.Well . a different reason is
to /l'"'"^*'^'^''^"' individualized. Students who wantedattend two of the three sessions would graduate in 4 vears like theydo now. But those who wanted could go to all the sessions and graduatem 3 years, something you can't really do easily with the current
semester systen and the small summer school program we have no.....
"I guess those are my major reasons, I can't really think of anything
else right now.
.
.
-re,
Interviewer: OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus fa.
In our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across thehall. Why don t you take a short break if you'd like and then
-o over
there. The others should also be finished with their interviews by now
and are probably drifting in.
*
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Page 2, Version 6
(Trimester message: Two arguments version, rendition 2)
Mr. ^(^ss^ass
Intervier-^er:
Mr.
T'Tl" ^ '^"^ '^•^"^ '^^ consider, but
?ro;M: T^'° University should switchf om its current f.:o-semester system to a trimester system.
Fine. I'll just let you go ahead now with your reasons for why you
reel the way you do.
OK...Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about how I felt on thistopic, I ve tried to think pretty carefully cbout vhv I feel th-s
way... You know, oven though the trimester topic was assigned to me
Instead of me getting to choose it, it's a topic that I think isinteresting and one that I think I know somethinc about.
-One
reason why I feci the way I do is that with a trimester system,
there would be less people on campus at cny one time during the
year. Therefore it would be less crowded on ccmpus than it is
.now and I think that during any one of the sessions of the trimester,
it would make for a more intimate campus atmosphere
,
Interviewer: ...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Mr,4j!E^3g5: Well, yes.
..I was just thinking a minute .. .Uell a different reason
is that at some other Universities like Michigan where they have a
trimester system, almost everybody, both faculty and students, really
likes it. According to this friend I have at Michigan, one main
reason is that people prefer having more- frequent breaks from school
rather than having one long summer break and a betiveen semester break...
--I guess those arc my major reasons, I can't really think of anything
else right now.
...
Interviewer: OK, that was fine, I'd like to thank you for participating thus far in
our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the
hall. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over
there. The others should also be finished with their incer-ziews by nwj
and are probably drifting in.
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• Page 2, Version 7
«.
"'''^''^
''^ arguTnents version, rendition 1)nf.A^Qk^: Veil, of course I rpaHT^o tu^^
»n,.^^:.„
,,,,,
_ ^^^^ ^^.^^
th
Cr?:^j\r„:rr^^rij jL'fjrv-"'-^ -------
it would be less crowded on campus than it in now and I think that
more intimate campus atmosphere i would say that another reasonfor ny op nion is that I think that the trimester system smor'ind v.dualized. students who wanted to attend two of the hrersess-uns
r thrsL^t '-"%^^^^/^^ey do now. But those who Cl^ter: ^ d
ILMJI '^^'^ and graduate in 3 years, something vou can'treally do easily with the current semester system and the small sumnorschool program we have now i guess that a related point is that
Till It A
"""^ '""'"'^ ''''^
= = the summerl ke they do now But, for whatever reason, some might prefer to beoff duang a different season, like tho Winter for instance, and withthe trimester system this would be possible..
Interviewer:
...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Hr.4t^tffm: Well, yes...: was just thinking a minute. ..
--Well , a somewhat different
reason is based on econom.ic factors. The University buildings arekept open all year round as it is now since they're used bv faculty
and graduate students in the summer. With a trimester svstem, it would h
much more economical since they'd be used all year round' by morepeople...-—You know, another thing is that at some other Universities
like Michigan where they have a trimester svstem. almost everybody, both
faculty and students, really likes it. According uo this friend I have
at Michigan, one main reason is that people prefer navinji m.ore frequent
breaks from school rather than havinj one long summer break and a
between semester break Let's see..
-Well, oh yes. One other, and
I think very Important reason is that a trimester system would be much
better for those students who need to or want to work when school is not
in session. The way it is now, with everybody looking for work during
the summer, competition for jobs is really terrible. Oti a trimester
system with students off from school at different times during the year,
It would ba much easier for students to find the jobs that they need...
I guess those are my major reasons, I can't really think of anything
else right now.
Inteirvlewer: CK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus far in
our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the hall.
Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over there.
The othtirs should also be finished with their interviews by no;- and are
probably drifting in.
Page 2, Version 8
(Trimester message:
.Six arguments version, rendition 2)
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Mr. well of course I rcnll.e that there are .aay fnctors to consider, hut
.
overall l d have to say that in my opinion the University shouldswitch from its current tv;o-semester system to a trimester system.
Interviewer: Fine. I'll just let you go ahead now with your reasons for why you
reel the way you do. / /
«
Mr./jCJ55a3lp: OK Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about how I felt on thistopic, I ve tried to think pretty carefully about why I feel this wny
You know, even thout^h the trimester topic was assigned to mc instead
of me getting to choose it, it's a topic that I think is interestinp
and one that I think I know something about.
---One reason why I feelthe way I do is that the trimester system gives both faculty and
students more freedom. What I mean is that those who wanted could take
off from school in the summer like they do now. But, for whatever
reason, some might prefer to be off during a different season, like the
Winter for instance and with the trimester system this would be
possible 1 would say that another and very important reason is that
a trimester system wonld be much better for those students who need to
or want to work when school is not in session. The way it is now, with
everybody looking for work during the summer, competition for jobs is
really terrible. On a trimester system with students being off from school
at different times during the year, it would be much easier for student-;
to find the jobs that they need .You know, another thing is that at
some Universities like Michigan where they have a trimester system, almost
everybody, both faculty and students, really likes it. According to this
friend I have at Michigan, one main reason is that people prefer having
more frequent breaks from school rather- than having one long summer
break and a between semester break
Interviewer: ...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?
Hr. f^fyt^: Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute ... .f,;o 11 , a somewhat different
reason is based on economic factors. The University buildings are
kept open all year round as it Is now since they're used by faculty and
graduate students in the sumner. With a trimester system, it would be
much more economical since they'd be used all year round by more people...
...I" guess that another reason for my opinion is that I think that tho
trimester system is mor.? individualized. St>5dents who wanted to attcna
two of the three sessions would graduate in 4 years like they do now.
But those who wanted could go to all the sessions and graduate in 3
years, something you can't really do easily with the current semester
system and the small summer school program we- have now Let's see...
Well, oh yes. One other point that I think is inportsmt is that with a
trimester system, there would be less people on campus at any one time
during the year. Therefore it would be less crowded on campus than it
is now and I think that during any one of the sessions of the trimester
It would make for c more intimate campus atmosphere I guess those
are my major reasons, I can't think of anything else right now.
Interviewer: OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus far in
our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the hall.
Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over there.
The others should also be finished with their Interviews by now and arc
probably drifting in.
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A.
Opinion Change Marginal Means for Higher OrderInteractions Involving the Sex and/or Topic Variable
^ function of Time of Assessment. PerceivedConsequences, Arguments, and Message Topic
Time of
Assessment
Sleep m
High
Consequences
essage
Cons
Low
equences
Trimester
High
Consequences
Message
Low
Cnncpniionr^Qo
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
Initial 2.15 1.70 1.82
.94 4.25 1.04 2.94 2.14
Delayed 1.97 1.22
—
1.43
.72 3.59 2.10 2.79 .50
B. Opinion change as a function of Time of Assessment, Communicator
Lltceability, Arguments, and Message Topic
Time of
Assessment
Sleep message Trimester Message
Lik
Comm
eable
unicator
Unlik
Commu
eable
nicator
Likeable
Communicator
Unlike able
Commun leator
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
six
argu-
ments
two
argu-
ments
Initial 2.12 1.87 1.78 .58 4.09 2.08 2.99 .98
j
Delayed 1.53 1.52 1.86 .25 4.31 1.48 1.92 1.21
1
- _ i
Opinion change as a function of Time of Assessment, Sex, and
.Message topic
Time of
Assessment
Sleep message Trimester message |
Males Females Males
—
—
T
Females
|
Initial 1.53 1.71 2.16 2.83
I
1
Delayed
1
1.16 1.43 2.47 1.98
j
1 ,
'
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Footnotes
1. This study also employed a moderate credibility condition in whichno information was provided regarding the source's LentitJ T^e opinions
s^\T; h^ r'^'^'" '^'^ -iJway betweel th^^ Expres-ed by subjects exposed to the high credibility and low credibility
communicator, respectively. uxu^xx
2. While topics on which the individual perceives that holding anopinion nas consequences for him(her)self or for others may often betopics of high importance or personal relevance, this need not necessarilybe the case, ror example, a juror may expend considerable effort in care-fully screening the evidence presented for and against a particularposition on an issue (e.g., a civil law suit) because of the consequences
of his/her expressed opinion for other persons, even though for the iuror hherself, the issue has little personal relevance. ^
^* ^ repeated measures analysis of opinion change, the nested massage
rendition variable interacted with the consequences variable (p .05) andthe coirjTiunicator likeability variable (£=.05). These interactionsindicate that the impact of both the consequences and the likeability
manipulation on opinions fluctuated somewhat depending upon which rendi-
tion of the persuasive message was received.
4. Tlie following effects were significant jj>s .05 or smaller) in an
analysis of variance on subjects' age: Likeabilitv main effect; Sex X
Consequences, Sex X Likeability, Sex X Topic, Arguments X Topic, Sex X
Likeability X Arguments and Likeability X Arguments X Topic interactions.
5.
^
Subjects' initial opinions were assessed by having them mark 15-
point agreement scales while their delayed opinions were solicited over
the phone by having them respond orally to a 5-point agreement scale. For
purposes of data analysis, subjects' delayed agreement scores were trans-
formed to 15-point scales (see Minium, 1970, p. 115).
6. These and other means appearing in the text, tables, and figures,
have been adjusted for subjects' age.
7. The results obtained with the two difference score indices (sum of
message-oriented minus communicator-oriented index and sum. of positive
minus sum of negative thoughts index) did not differ in any substantial
way from the results obtained when the components of these difference
scores were analyzed separately.
8. Virtually identical factors were obtained when the data from male
and female subjects were considered separately.
9. In a four regression problems, the sum of positive minus sum of
negative i ..oughts index did not enter the prediction equation due to an
insufficient tolerance level for inclusion.
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thought, on'the co..uL r!\;:y'jLSi: bel '^V't'^sage and thus unpersuaded by it If such thou^h^r ^ "ting function. It Is still not clear «hv Tu rt ^""^ ^ dlstrac-dlstractlon would necessarUrUad to dlcroLfd 'r^^w'thln"",""' .
iiiz: Tz: to z'-^'rTT''^ hrs:ciir urgi;:"r'
tolf^-->-
^^^^^
11. An adequate test of this hypothesis required that the decayed
Inlll \ t . initial opinion posttest and further, that the delayedposttest be divorced from the earlier laboratory content in which theinitial posttest had been conducted. Because previous work on persistenceeffects have typically employed posttest delay intervals ranging f^om oneto two weeks (cf., Cook & Flay, Note 3), it was decided to conduct thedelayed opinion posttest 10 days after the initial posttest. In actualitysubjects opinions were reassessed anywhere between 8 and 15 days after
an lllT.rlj'''T^"^\"^'^ '"^^^ ^"'"'^^'^l averaging 10.30 days acrossll subjects. An analysis of variance using number of days between po3t-tests as the dependent variable yielded no effects, indic^iting tha- all
experimental groups had been subjected to approximately the same posttestdelay interval. Regarding the second requirement, unless playing the
role of cooperative subjects" to the hilt, the low rate of suspicion orinnocent mention of their earlier laboratory exi^erience expressed hy
suDjects during the "telephone opinion sur^/ey" suggested that the experi-
ment had been successful in divorcing the context of the delayed pos^tes-from the context of the initial opinion posttest.
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